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ARTICLES
The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal:
Do We Need It? Will It Work?*
By ARTHUR D. HELLMAN**
Introduction
On June 29, 1983, all but unnoticed by the press or by the legal
profession, the Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee approved legislation that would create an "Intercircuit Tribunal
of the United States Courts of Appeals."' The proposed Tribunal
would be an appellate court, but no appeals would be taken directly to
it. Rather, the Supreme Court would be empowered to refer any case
on its certiorari or appeal docket to the Tribunal for decision. Unless
overruled or modified by the Supreme Court, the decisions of the Tri-
bunal would constitute binding precedents in all federal courts and,
with respect to federal issues, in state courts as well.
The Tribunal's sponsors have taken pains to meet some of the con-
cerns aroused by earlier proposals for a new national court.2 No liti-
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1. S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 601-07 (1983); see 129 CONG. REC. S1947-48 (daily
ed. Mar. 1, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Dole). Subcommittee approval of the bill is reported in
129 CONG. REC. D923 (daily ed. June 29, 1983); the report erroneously omits mention of the
Intercircuit Tribunal proposal contained in Title VI.
2. In 1972, a study group headed by Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law School
proposed the creation of a new court that would assist the Supreme Court in selecting cases
for plenary consideration. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON
THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 18-24 (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 590-95
(1972) [hereinafter cited as FREUND STUDY GROUP]. The proposal received almost univer-
sal condemnation and, in the words of one of its leading. critics, was "talked to death...
literally as well as figuratively." Friendly, Averting the Floodby Lessening the Flow, 59 COR-
NELL L. REV. 634, 635 (1974). For a concise summary of the criticisms and a rebuttal by a
member of the Study Group, see A. BICKEL, THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1973); see also Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925:
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gant would be denied access to the Supreme Court; on the contrary, the
decisions of the Tribunal-in cases already screened by the Justices-
could be reviewed by the High Court on writ of certiorari. No new
judgeships would be created, nor would the new structure be given per-
manent status immediately. Rather, the legislation contemplates a
"temporary" court consisting of court of appeals judges who would sit
on the Tribunal for limited periods of time while continuing to serve in
their own circuits.
Notwithstanding these attempted palliatives, the proposed legisla-
tion would effect the most far-reaching change in the operation of the
federal judicial system since the creation of intermediate appellate
courts nearly a century ago.3 If the bill is enacted, the power to estab-
lish nationally binding precedents, now exercised by the Supreme
Court alone,4 would be shared with a new court. And the character of
the Supreme Court's own work would be altered in ways that cannot be
fully anticipated.
The low level of interest in the Intercircuit Tribunal probably re-
sults from a widespread assumption that this proposal, like its prede-
The Plenary Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1715-16 (1978). Three years later,
a commission headed by Senator Roman L. Hruska recommended creation of a permanent
National Court of Appeals "to increase the capacity of the federal judicial system for defini-
tive adjudication of issues of national law, subject always to Supreme Court review." COM-
MISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 5 (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D.
195, 208 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT]. This proposal gar-
nered considerably more support, but it too had its critics. Compare Legislationfor the Im-
provement of the Judiciary: Hearings on Judicial Survivors Annuities, Establishment of a
National Court fAppeals, Omnibus Judgeship Bill, and Federal Jurisdiction Over Department
of Labor Employee Compensation Suits Before the Subcomm. on Courts ofthe Senate Comm
on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 292 (1982) (statement of Professor Meador) (bibliogra-
phy of "Published Articles on Need for New Federal Appellate Court") [hereinafter cited as
1982 National Court Hearings, with Alsup, Reservations on the Proposal ofthe Hruska Com-
mission to Establish a National Court ofAppeals, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 431 (1976); Lay, Why
Rush to Judgment?, 59 JUDICATURE 173 (1975); Swygert, The Proposed National Court of
Appeals: A Threat to Judicial Symmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, REPORT: THE NEEDS OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS 18-20 (1977).
3. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1712.
4. In a few specific areas of federal law this power is shared with the new Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). However, unlike the Supreme Court, the CAFC
does not maintain its supremacy by reviewing the decisions of the regional courts of appeals;
rather, its power to establish nationally binding precedents derives from the fact that it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over particular classes of cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)
(1982); see generally Note, An Appraisal ofthe Court ofAppealsfor the Federal Circuit, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 301 (1984). The fundamental unsoundness of this approach is demonstrated in
Posner, Will the Federal Courts ofAppeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and
Specialization ofthe Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761, 785-87 (1983).
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cessors, will soon fall victim to opposition or indifference.5 But that
assumption would be quite premature. The Tribunal, which first
emerged (though without a name) in Chief Justice Burger's speech to
the American Bar Association in February 1983,6 has already made
substantially greater progress than any previous national court propo-
sal. The ABA speech itself marked the first time that the Chief Justice
had endorsed a specific recommendation for a new structure in the fed-
eral judicial system. Within weeks, implementing legislation was intro-
duced in both houses of Congress,7 and in late June, as already noted,
the Senate bill (in a slightly modified version) received subcommittee
approval. That was an even more important milestone; no previous
proposal had ever been approved by any Congressional subcommittee.
The legislation suffered a temporary setback in the fall of 1983 when
the Department of Justice declined to endorse it' and Justice Stevens
spoke out in opposition,9 but within a few months the momentum was
restored: four other members of the Court-Justices White, Powell,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor-joined the Chief Justice in expressing sup-
port for the Tribunal.'" In September 1984, the Subcommittee on
5. Legislation to implement the Freund Study Group's proposal for a screening court
was never introduced in either House of Congress. Bills to create a National Court of Ap-
peals along the lines proposed by the Hruska Commission were introduced in the Senate,
but did not proceed beyond the hearing stage. See Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439
U.S. 1014, 1025 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
6. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442 (1983).
7. See 129 CONG. REC. S1947-48 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Dole); id at
HI 192-93 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). The House bill is H.R.
1970, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); the Senate bill is described supra note 1. When he intro-
duced the legislation in the House, Congressman Kastenmeier stated that Chief Justice Bur-
ger, as an individual, had "expressed support" for the proposal. 129 CONG. Rac. HI 193
(daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983).
8. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan C. Rose testified on behalf of the government
at hearings held by the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Judiciary Committee. Emphasizing that "no consensus has been devel-
oped for the proposed Intercircuit Tribunal" and that "a number of serious concerns have
been expressed about the impact that such a tribunal would have on the operations of the
federal judiciary," Mr. Rose stated that the department "could endorse the . . . proposal
only after Congress has acted on existing proposals to repeal the Court's mandatory appel-
late jurisdiction, limit or repeal diversity jurisdiction, and restrict prisoner petitions." State-
ment of Jonathan C. Rose, Asst. Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, Concerning the
Workload of the Supreme Court 31-32 (Nov. 10, 1983).
9. Justice Stevens asserted that the need for additional decisional capacity had not
been demonstrated, that "the new court would do nothing to alleviate the workload of [the
Supreme] Court," and that creation of the new court "would increase the burdens of our
already over-worked Courts of Appeals." Letter from Justice Stevens to Rep. Kastenmeier
(Oct. 25, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Stevens Letter].
10. Letter from Justice White to Rep. Kastenmeier (Mar. 6, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
White Letter]; Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Rep. Kastenmeier (June 8, 1984) [hereinafter
Sping 19841 DO WE NEED IT. WILL IT WORK?
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Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Judiciary Committee approved an amended version of the bill for full
committee action.' I
Proponents argue that creation of the new court is necessary for
two distinct reasons: "to relieve the dramatically increased workload of
the Supreme Court" and to "provide desperately needed additional de-
cisional capacity for the resolution of disputes where nationwide uni-
formity is needed." 12  Analysis of these arguments implicates
fundamental questions about the role of the Supreme Court in the
American legal system and the extent to which one tribunal of nine
Justices can fulfill that role. In this Article I shall address those ques-
tions. I conclude that notwithstanding its impressive sponsorship, the
legislation should not be enacted, at least in its present form. To the
extent that it seeks to reduce the workload of the Justices, it is unneces-
sary. To the extent that it seeks to promote uniformity in the law, it
rests on assumptions that have not been proved; but even if those as-
sumptions are correct, creation of a temporary tribunal would do little
to foster uniformity, while it would have an undesirable effect on the
Supreme Court's performance of the tasks it would not delegate.
cited as Rehnquist Letter]; Letter from Justice O'Connor to Rep. Kastenmeier (June 11,
1984) [hereinafter cited as O'Connor Letter]. These letters will be printed as part of the
hearing record on H.R. 1970. Justice Powell reportedly authorized a statement to the effect
that he shares the views of Justice White.
It appears that Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall did not respond to Congressman
Kastenmeier's invitation to express their opinions on the pending legislation. However, in
the past both Justices have spoken out against proposals for new courts that would be given
some of the authority now vested in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Brennan, Some Thoughts
on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230, 235 (1983); Remarks of Mr. Justice
Marshall, Acceptance of Learned Hand Medal 8-9 (May 1, 1975), quoted in N.Y.L.J., May 5,
1975, at 2-3. Justice Blackmun has taken no position on the Intercircuit Tribunal.
In early 1984, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor met with members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee in an apparent effort to move the Intercircuit Tribunal bill forward.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1984, at A20, col. 1.
11. See 130 CONG. REC. Dl 142 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). The subcommittee made one
major change in the jurisdictional provisions of the bill: under H.R. 1970 as amended, the
Supreme Court would be empowered to refer only cases from federal courts to the Intercir-
cuit Tribunal. It appears that this modification was adopted at the suggestion of state-court
judges who objected to having their decisions reviewed by a subordinate federal court. See
generally Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Needfor
Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 943 (1976). The current version of the
Senate bill would permit referral of cases from state as well as federal courts.
As a practical matter, it makes little difference which of the two versions is enacted.
State-court cases deserving resolution by a national court almost invariably involve issues of
civil rights or federalism. See infra note 206. For reasons developed in part IV, it is unlikely
that the Court would ever refer such cases to a subordinate tribunal even if the legislation
permitted it. See infra notes 201-09 and accompanying text.
12. See 129 CONG. REc. S1947-48 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
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The Article is divided into five parts. Part I discusses the workload
of the Justices. Part II looks at the problem of uniformity in the law,
and part III considers whether the proposed court would be effective in
reducing disuniformity. Part IV examines the effect on the Supreme
Court of creating an Intercircuit Tribunal, and part V addresses the
task of designing a structure that would enlarge the national decisional
capacity with a minimum of risk to the overall operation of the judicial
system.
One preliminary observation is in order. During the past two
years, eight of the nine sitting Justices have expressed concern about
the Court's caseload and the management of its docket.13 And a bare
majority of the Court has now endorsed the proposal for an Intercircuit
Tribunal. I4 However, it is worth emphasizing that the diagnoses of-
fered by the eight Justices are quite different and to some extent contra-
dictory. Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor think that limited
decisional capacity is causing the Court to deny review in some cases
that require resolution at the national level; 5 Justice Stevens thinks
that the Court grants review in more cases than are necessary.' 6 Chief
Justice Burger finds a plenary docket of 150 cases a Term-the current
figure--to be so burdensome as to threaten a breakdown of the sys-
tem;17 but in the eyes of Justice Rehnquist, it is well within tolerable
limits. I" The Chief Justice predicts an increase in summary reversals,
13. See Handler, What To Do With The Supreme Court's Burgeoning Calendars?, 5
CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 250-58 (1984) (summarizing Justices' statements).
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Cf. Heflin, How Do You Spell Judicial
Relief Intercircuit Tribunal, JUDGES' J., Fall 1983, at 16, 19 ("There are indications that a
clear majority of the judges on the United States Supreme Court recognize that there is a
grave problem and that something must be done.").
15. See Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978) (White, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); White, Challengesfor the US. Supreme
Court and the Bar. Contemporary Reections, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 275, 277-78 (1982); Rehn-
quist Letter, supra note 10; Rehnquist, A Pleafor Hep: Solutions to Serious Problems Cur-
rendy Experienced by the Federal Judicial System, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 4-5 (1984);
O'Connor Letter, supra note 10. But see infra note 234. Although Justice Blackmun joined
Justice White's dissent in Brown Transport and had expressed similar concerns earlier, see
HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 185, 67 F.R.D. at 404 (Letter of Justice
Blackmun), he has not, as far as I know, taken part in the current caseload debate. See supra
note 10.
16. Stevens, Some Thoughts on JudicialRestraint, 66 JUDICATURE 177, 182 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Stevens, JudicialRestraint]; Stevens, The Ltfe Span ofa Judge-Made Rule, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 16-21 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Stevens, Judge-Mfade Rule]. Justice
Brennan has expressed sympathy for this view. See Brennan, supra note 10, at 231.
17. Rxfor an Overburdened Supreme Court: Is Reliefin Sight? 66 JUDICATURE 394,407
(1983) (remarks of Chief Justice Burger).
18. Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 6.
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especially in criminal cases;' 9 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
think that the summary reversal is overused even today." Justices
Powell and O'Connor have spoken only in the most general terms
about the Supreme Court's workload; their principal concern has been
the proliferation of litigation in the lower federal courts.2'
This diversity of views hardly provides a sound basis for immedi-
ate structural reform. On the contrary, it only serves to emphasize the
need for careful analysis of the Court's functions and practices before
any legislation is enacted.
I. The Workload of the Justices
In considering whether the Justices are overworked, it is necessary
to look separately at the two tasks they perform: selecting the cases
they will decide, and deciding them. Attention must also be given to
the effect of the obligatory jurisdiction on the Court's workload.
A. Screening Cases for Plenary Review
With the possible exception of Justice Stevens, no member of the
present Court has asserted that the process of screening cases for ple-
nary review has become unmanageable.22 Nor would such an assertion
be persuasive. Admittedly, the number of cases to be examined is
much greater than it was two decades ago-4,205 in the 1982 Term.'
But a caseload of that size does not impose nearly the burden that it
would, for example, at the court of appeals level.
From the day of Chief Justice Taft onward, the Justices have em-
phasized that the function of the Supreme Court is not to correct errors
in the lower courts, but to "secur[e] harmony of decision and the appro-
19. See infra text accompanying note 231.
20. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966, 972-73 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 387-88
(1982) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
21. Powell, Are the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371
(1982); S. O'Connor, Comments on the Supreme Court's Case Load, delivered in New Orle-
ans, Louisiana, at 13-14 (Feb. 6, 1983) (available on request from the Public Information
Office, U.S. Supreme Court) [hereinafter cited as O'Connor Comments].
22. Justice White, for example, has said that "permitting someone else to choose our
150 cases ... would ... not [save us] enough [time] to make any substantial contribution
to our difficulties." White, supra note 15, at 282. And although Justice Stevens has argued
that the Court is "too busy to give the certiorari docket the attention it deserves," Stevens,
Judicial Restraint, supra note 16, at 179, his real complaint is not that the selection process
imposes a great burden, but rather that his colleagues are too free in granting review of cases
that he believes need not be heard by the Supreme Court. Id at 182.
23. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3025 (1983); see also infra note 32 (2,185 cases in 1961 Term).
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priate settlement of questions of general importance."24 Thus, except
for the cases that come to the Court on appeal-less than five percent
of the total2 -- the purpose of screening is not to determine whether
there was error, or even probable error, in the court below. Rather, the
Court considers whether the case presents an issue of "wide public im-
portance or governmental interest. '26 Making that determination will
usually take very little time, compared with assessing the probable cor-
rectness of the decision below.
2 7
What is more important, the vast majority of applications clearly
do not meet the standard for "certworthiness" that the Justices have
articulated. A few years ago, Justice Brennan revealed that seventy
percent of the cases were so obviously unworthy of review that not even
one Justice requested that they be discussed at the Court's conference.28
More recently, Chief Justice Burger-who has been in the forefront of
those arguing that the Court is overburdened-said that two-thirds of
the new filings are not only unworthy of review but "utterly
frivolous. 2 9
Perusal of the case summaries in United States Law Week confirms
these perceptions. In one case after another, the party seeking review
asserts only that the lower court abused its discretion or erred in apply-
ing well-established rules to particular facts.3" And those are the paid
24. Address of Chief Justice Hughes, American Law Institute Meeting, reprinted in 20
A.B.A. J. 341, 341 (1934). For similar statements by members of the present Court, see, e.g.,
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and
White, J., dissenting); Brennan, supra note 10, at 231 (quoting speech by Justice White);
Stevens, Judicial Restraint, supra note 16, at 180. Whether the Justices always adhere to this
principle is of course another question-one that cannot be pursued here.
25. See Burger, supra note 6, at 444 (244 appeals out of 4,434 dispositions in 1981
Term); Court Re/orn Legislation: Hearings on S. 1529, 1531 & 1532 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 182 (1981) (report by
Congressional Research Service on Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction) (data for 1976
through 1980 Terms) [hereinafter cited as 1981 National Court Hearings].
26. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 3100 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery f the Senate Judiciary Comna, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
40 (1978) (letter signed by all nine sitting Justices) [hereinafter cited as Supreme Court Juris-
diction Hearingil.
27. See Brennan, supra note 10, at 234; White, supra note 15, at 282.
28. Brennan, The National Court of4ppeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 473,
479 (1973).
29. Chie/ Justice Burger' Challenge to Congress, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 14,
1983, at 38, 40 [hereinafter cited as Burger Interview]. See also White, supra note 15, at 282
(at least 60 percent of the cases presented for review have no merit at all).
30. See, e.g., Snowshoe Co. v. Kruse, 104 S. Ct. 1413 (1984) (certiorari petition summa-
rized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3470 (1983)); Kirk v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 396 (1983) (certiorari
petition summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3374 (1983)); Dixon v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 160
(1983) (certiorari petition summarized at 52 U.S.L.W. 3195 (1983)).
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cases. Almost half of all applications for review are filed by indigent
litigants, 31 most of whom are criminal defendants who have nothing to
lose by filing petitions whether or not they present an issue appropriate
for the Supreme Court. 2
B. Deciding Cases and Writing Opinions
The screening process thus constitutes a relatively small part of the
Justices' total workload. The more time-consuming task is that of
reaching decisions and writing opinions in the 140 to 150 cases that do
receive plenary consideration each Term. Yet it is far from clear that a
calendar of that size truly imposes an intolerable burden on the
Justices.
Under current conditions, each Justice is required to write fifteen
or sixteen majority opinions a Term-barely two for each month that
the Court is in session. Some of the cases involve intractable social and
political issues warranting extended reflection and research, but not all
fit this description. For example, by the time the Court resolves a statu-
tory issue the competing arguments should have been thoroughly venti-
lated in the lower courts and the law reviews, and the Justices should
be able to reach a decision and write their opinions with a minimum of
agonizing.
31. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3025 (1983) (in the 1982 Term,formapauperis cases accounted for
2,035 of the 4,205 filings).
32. See G. CASPER & R. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT 34-35
(1976) (in the 1973 Term, criminal cases accounted for all but 210 of the 2,070 applications
for review filed by indigents); Burger, supra note 6, at 444 (in the 1981 Term, criminal cases
accounted for all but 480 of the 1,972 indigent cases denied review).
Notwithstanding the analysis in the text, so much attention has been paid to total
caseload figures that two recent developments deserve mention. First, the rate of increase in
the number of cases filed with the Court has declined dramatically from what it was in the
1960's. In the decade preceding the issuance of the Freund Study Group's report in 1972,
the growth rate averaged just under 7% a year. See FREUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at
A2, 57 F.R.D. at 614 (caseload climbed from 2,185 in 1961 to 3,643 in 1971, an increase of
67%). Over the past decade the rate has been only about 2% a year. Thus, even in the 1981
Term, which brought the largest number of new cases in the Court's history, the total was
only 21% greater than it was in the 1971 Term. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3020 (1982) (4,422 cases
filed in 1981 Term, an increase of 779 over 1971). In contrast, filings in the federal courts of
appeals more than doubled over the same period. See DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 185 (1981) (Table 1) (26,362 appeals filed in courts of
appeals in statistical year 1981, compared with 12,788 in statistical year 1971). Second, the
volume of new filings fell by 5% in the 1982 Term. Moreover, the entire decline came in the
paid cases, which take much more of the Justices' time than those filed by indigents. See
Greenhouse, Does the Workload Justify a New Appellate Court N.Y. Times, July 20, 1983,
at A12, col. 3. The figures for 1983 were almost identical to those for 1982. See 53 U.S.L.W.
3028 (1984).
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This is not to deprecate the amount of time and effort required for
the process of reaching and justifying decisions in the cases that receive
plenary consideration. After all, the Justices not only have their own
opinions to write; they should also give careful scrutiny to the drafts
prepared by their colleagues.33 And if caseload pressures become too
great, review of other Justices' opinions is likely to be the first casualty,
thus reducing the opportunities for clarifying the language, sharpening
the reasoning, or otherwise improving the final product through colle-
gial consultation.
This analysis suggests that whether or not the workload has begun
to overwhelm the Justices, creation of a new court might still be desira-
ble on a different theory: that the Supreme Court could then reduce
the number of cases that receive plenary consideration and thus be able
to produce opinions of higher quality-however one might measure
that elusive goal. Indeed, improving the quality of opinions was a ma-
jor theme of the speech in which Chief Justice Burger broached the
idea embodied in the pending proposal.
34
It might seem intuitively obvious that the Justices would write bet-
ter opinions if they had more time. Nevertheless, the available evi-
dence indicates that the matter is not that simple. In the late 1950's and
early 1960's the Court was hearing fewer cases than at any other time
in this century;35 but that was also the era when eminent scholars filled
the law reviews with devastating criticisms of the Court's craftsman-
ship.36 Not everyone agreed with those criticisms, 37 but the history
provides little support for the assertion that a smaller docket leads to
wiser adjudications or more illuminating opinions. More recently, the
abortion decisions of 1973 were handed down only after an extended
process of research, reflection, and deliberation;38 yet those opinions
too have been subjected to vehement attacks, even by scholars who
33. See Helman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 937, 972 (1980).
34. See Burger, supra note 6, at 445.
35. The period of relative inactivity began in the 1947 Term, shortly after Fred M.
Vinson became Chief Justice, and continued throughout the Warren Court era. See
Hellman, supra note 2, at 1730-31.
36. See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process The
Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1957); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-
Foreword- The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 & passim (1959); Kur-
land, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term-Foreword" "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARV. L. REv. 143, 169-75 (1964).
37. See, e.g., Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court,
84 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1971).
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Both cases
were argued initially in the 1971 Term and reargued in 1972.
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sympathize with the results.
3 9
A more plausible argument is that if the Justices were to hear
fewer cases, they would not necessarily write better opinions, but they
would be able to reduce the incidence of fragmented majorities and the
proliferation of separate opinions that cause such confusion for lawyers
and lower courts.4° The premise is that the pressures of caseload today
make it impossible for the Justices to hammer out consensus opinions,
leaving them no alternative but separate expression of views.
Professor Frank Easterbrook has recently argued that divided de-
cisions and multiple opinions "stem in large part from circumstances
beyond the Court's control."41 Whether or not one agrees with his
analysis, the available evidence simply does not support the assump-
tion that if the Justices could spend more time on the cases that receive
plenary consideration, they would use it to work toward consensus
opinions rather than writing separately. For example, Professor Den-
nis Hutchinson's study of decisional practices under Chief Justice Vin-
son points out that when the Court "was able or willing to debate issues
internally at great length,. . . it frequently produced multiple opinions
and judgments with no majority opinion. ' 42 More recently, former
Justice Potter Stewart, when asked shortly after his retirement whether
he had any regrets about his tenure on the Court, expressed the wish
that he had had more time to write his own dissenting opinions instead
of joining dissents that "were written not exactly the way I would have
written them."'43 In short, there can be no doubt that the members of
the present Court, even more than their predecessors, have a strong
desire to make known their individual views in the cases before them.
The evidence suggests that with a smaller plenary docket the Justices
would satisfy this desire more often, rather than spend the extra time
working with the authoring Justice to produce a single opinion that
embodied the majority's collective wisdom. 4
39. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof- A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 926-27, 947 & passim (1973).
40. See, e.g., Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword." Freedom of Expression in
the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 72 (1980); Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial Deci-
sionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1128-30 (1981).
41. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 811 (1982).
42. Hutchinson, Felix Frankfurter and the Business of the Supreme Court, 0. T 1946-
O.T 1961, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 143, 208-09.
43. Interview With Justice Potter Stewart, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1982, at 1, 9.
44. "[Mlany of the issues in plurality decisions have been before the Court repeatedly,
giving it several opportunities to resolve them. In the aggregate there was ample time for the
Court to reach agreement, if time were the only problem." Note, supra note 40, at 1137
(footnotes omitted). See also Edwards, The Role ofa Judge in Modern Society: Some Reec-
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In any event, before we can reach any conclusions about the bur-
dens imposed by the plenary docket, we must consider the actions of
the Justices themselves. If the members of the present Court are truly
overworked, they are behaving in some very strange ways. Consider:
-Separate expressions of views have proliferated in recent years
to an extent never before known. In the 1981 Term alone the Justices
issued more than 175 separate opinions.45 It is understandable and in-
deed desirable that a Justice would write separately when he or she
cannot support the result or rationale of the majority opinion.46 But
more than twenty of these separate opinions were written by Justices
who had already joined the opinion of the majority.47 In addition,
there were half a dozen dissenting opinions by Justices who had al-
ready joined another dissent.48 Strangest of all, there was one case in
which the author of the majority opinion also wrote a separate opinion
reversing the court below on a second ground,49 and another case in
which two opinions were joined by different majorities of Justices.5 0
-In the 1982 Term, a majority of the Court (including all of the
Justices who have been most vocal in expressing concern over the
Court's workload) adopted a new formulation of the "adequate state
ground" doctrine. The new test permits the Court to review state court
decisions that invoke federal law in an ambiguous way, as long as the
state court has not indicated "clearly and expressly" that its judgment
rests on nonfederal grounds.5 Reasonable persons can differ over
whether this new approach will foster or frustrate a healthier relation-
ship between federal and state courts; 52 what cannot be doubted is that
it will give the Supreme Court the opportunity to hear some cases that
would have been deemed unreviewable under the doctrines that previ-
ously prevailed.53
lions on Current Practice in FederalAppellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 385, 421-22
(1983-84).
45. In the 1982 Term the total was 166, and in 1983 it was 140. (These and the other
figures in this paragraph do not include concurring and dissenting opinions less than a page
in length.)
Here and in the remainder of the Article, data on the Court's practices, unless otherwise
attributed, are drawn from my own research.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
47. There were 16 such opinions in the 1982 Term, and 17 in 1983.
48. There were seven such opinions in the 1982 Term, but only three in 1983.
49. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
50. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
51. Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 (1983).
52. Compare id with id at 3849-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. In a similar vein, only two weeks earlier, one member of the Long majority had
urged the Florida legislature to modify state law so as to leave no doubt that the United
Spring 19841
386 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 11:375
-In a number of cases over the last few years, the Court, without
hearing oral argument, has reversed lower court decisions that had ac-
cepted a litigant's federal constitutional claim. These reversals have
been accompanied by per curiam opinions, a few of which approach
the length of many signed opinions.54 Some of the cases have involved
only the application of established rules to particular facts." For the
most part, nothing in the per curiam opinions has suggested that the
particular situations are recurring ones, or that the decisions below re-
flect oft-repeated errors or a consistent disregard of the governing
law.56 Thus, consideration on the merits could not be justified either
from the standpoint of the Court's lawmaking function or as a neces-
sary exercise of its supervisory power.
5 7
States Supreme Court could review decisions of the Florida courts suppressing evidence
found to have been illegally seized. See Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct. 3100, 3101-02 (1983)
(Burger, C.J., concurring). Cf. Stevens Letter, supra note 9, at 3 ("[T]his Court could allevi-
ate some of its own workload problems if it were less active in reviewing state court judg-
ments that have little or no significance for anyone outside the State in which the case
arose.").
It is instructive to compare the development described in the text with the decisions of
the early and middle 1970's that reshaped the doctrines governing appellate review of three-
judge-court cases. In those decisions the Supreme Court stated quite explicitly that its inter-
pretation of an ambiguous jurisdictional statute was influenced by the desire to minimize the
number of cases that would have to be heard by the Justices rather than by the courts of
appeals. See, e.g., MTM, Inc. v. Baxley, 420 U.S. 799, 804 (1975); Gonzalez v. Automatic
Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 (1983); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339
(1981); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981).
55. See, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S.
4 (1982); Board v. Educ. v. McCluskey, 458 U.S. 966 (1982). Justice Stevens believes that
most of the recent summary reversals fit this description. See McCluske, 458 U.S. at 972 &
n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Cf. Bauman v. United States, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977) (standards for
mandamus).
57. Nor can the summary opinions be justified on the ground that they provide at least
some precedential guidance in areas of law that have been scanted in the cases receiving
plenary consideration. On the contrary, civil rights cases, which constitute the largest seg-
ment of the plenary docket, accounted for nearly two-thirds of the summary opinions in the
1977 through 1982 Terms.
The point in the text is well illustrated by the recent case of Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct.
453 (1983). The Ninth Circuit had granted habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner on the
ground that an unrecorded exparte communication between the trial judge and a juror had
tainted the defendant's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed summarily in a seven-page
opinion joined by five Justices. Three other Justices filed concurring and dissenting opin-
ions that filled another 34 pages. One of the dissenters argued that the case did not warrant
the Court's attention because it "primarily involve[d] the application of settled law to a
highly unusual set of facts." Id at 474 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority, without
responding explicitly to this contention, impliedly sought to justify the grant of review on the
ground that the court of appeals had established a per se rule "that an unrecorded exparte
communication between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error." Id. at 455. But
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As the Justices must recognize, the practice of reversing a handful
of cases for error, in the absence of an important issue, increases the
Court's workload to a much greater extent than the few hours required
to write and obtain agreement on the per curiam opinions5 8 First, the
case selection process becomes substantially more burdensome. No
longer can the Justices and their clerks give short shrift to petitions that
obviously do not raise recurring issues; instead, they must scrutinize
them to determine whether the lower court may have ruled incorrectly
on some question in which the Justices take a particular interest. Sec-
ond, the practice encourages other litigants-particularly those bring-
ing claims of the kind that have found favor with the Court-to seek
Supreme Court review even in cases not presenting important issues.59
The effect will be to increase the number of petitions that the Justices
must consider. Third, the knowledge that the Court is willing to re-
verse summarily will lead respondents to write longer briefs in opposi-
tion to the grant of review. Indeed, as commentators pointed out when
the Warren Court engaged in similar practices (albeit for a very differ-
ent group of beneficiaries), a respondent's counsel might well be remiss
in not presenting a full-dress argument on the merits of the case-con-
trary to orthodox admonitions°---if he suspects that this may be his
the court of appeals had decided the case by an unpublished order, thus, under the court's
rules, the decision could not have been cited as a precedent in other cases. See 9TH CIR. R.
21(d). Even assuming that the Ninth Circuit's ruling was erroneous, the only consequence
of allowing it to stand would have been to require a new trial in the one case.
The Court's first opinion of the 1984 Term also fits the pattern described in the text.
Florida v. Rodriguez, 53 U.S.L.W. 3359 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1984) (per curiam); see id at 3361
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (chiding Court for "undertak[ing] de novo review of the factual find-
ings of a state court" and "perform[ing] the error-correcting function that the Florida
Supreme Court has refused to perform").
58. What requires time and energy is not simply writing an opinion, but writing an
opinion that will gain the agreement of five Justices and thus provide authoritative guidance
for the future. Justice Stewart was not being entirely facetious when, in response to sugges-
tions that the Court's caseload problem could be ameliorated by increasing the number of
Justices, he said that his job would have been much easier if he had had no colleagues at all.
59. See Hart, srupra note 36, at 98 n.31. Today, for example, it would be difficult to
advise a conscientious prosecutor to refrain from seeking Supreme Court review of a judg-
ment invalidating a criminal conviction on federal constitutional grounds, whether or not
the case involved a "question of general importance," see supra note 24 and accompanying
text, as long as the issue was at least debatable. While the Court leaves many such decisions
undisturbed, see Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National Law, and the Selection of Cases
for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. PIr. L. REV. 521, 551 C1983), the possibility of summary
reversal (or the grant of plenary consideration) is substantial enough to justify the filing of a
petition if the prosecutor feels strongly that the appellate court erred.
60. See, e.g., R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 490 (5th ed. 1978).
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only opportunity to do So. 6 I The upshot is that the Justices would have
an even larger volume of material to read and consider.
-In the 1982 Term the Court, sua sponte, ordered reargument of
a state court case on the important issue of whether to recognize a "rea-
sonable belief' exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule.62 The issue had not been litigated in the courts below, nor had it
been raised in the petition for review. Three dissenting Justices pointed
out that these circumstances made the case an inappropriate vehicle for
deciding the issue.63 Eight Justices ultimately agreed with that conclu-
sion, but only after the Court had heard an unnecessary set of argu-
ments and engaged in what appears to have been an extensive internal
debate.
64
In a somewhat different vein, the Court scheduled two sets of ar-
guments on the important statutory issues raised by the home video
recording case. 65 These issues were already the subject of pending leg-
islation, and there was every reason to believe that Congress would
address the matter whichever way the Court decided.66 Thus, the grant
of review could at best establish a provisional status quo and would
almost certainly delay the final resolution of the question.6'
61. Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term-Foreword." Process of Law, 72 HARV. L.
REv. 77, 81-82 (1958); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 387 n.6 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 60, at 490-9 1.
62. Illinois v. Gates, 459 U.S. 1028 (1982).
63. Id at 1029 (Stevens, J., dissenting from order setting case for reargument).
64. Compare Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2321-25 (1983) (explaining why Court
was not deciding "reasonable belief' issue), with id at 2336-40 (White, J., concurring in
judgment) (arguing that Court should address issue). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 104 S.
Ct. 3583 (1984) (restoring case to calendar for reargument and directing parties to argue
issue not raised by certiorari petition).
65. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982), restored to calendarfor reargument, 103 S. Ct. 3568
(1983).
66. See Rapson, Legislative Relief and the Betamax Problem, 7 ART & THE LAW 125
(1982).
67. The home recording case did at least settle an important issue on a provisional
basis. The same cannot be said of the opinions in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73
(1983). In Johnson the Court granted certiorari to resolve an intercircuit conffict over the
question whether jury instructions violating the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979), could be harmless error. See Johnson, 460 U.S. at 75. But the Justices divided
evenly on that issue, see id. at 90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), with Justice Stevens voting to
affirm the judgment below on a ground rejected by all other members of the Court. As a
result, the conflict remained unresolved-a fact that was emphasized a week later when the
Court denied review in all of the cases that had been held to await the decision in Johnson.
Some of the held cases had found harmless error. See, e.g., Tweety v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983). Others had rejected a harmless error
rationale. See, e.g., Mason v. Balkcom, 669 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1016 (1983). In short, it was clear that nothing the Court said about the harmless error
C. Effect of the Obligatory Jurisdiction
Assessment of the "workload problem" also requires attention to
the fact that in selecting the cases it will decide, the Court today does
not have an entirely free hand. When a case comes to it on appeal
rather than by certiorari, the Court has no choice but to decide the
merits. The Court need not-and usually does not-give the case ple-
nary consideration or write an opinion, but it cannot avoid the duty of
determining whether the lower court committed error.68 In recent
Terms, about half of the cases decided on the merits have been
appeals.69
It is true that appeal cases constitute only five percent of the total
caseload,70 and that most of them are disposed of by summary orders
without opinion.7 1 And some people have reasoned from these facts
that abolition of the obligatory jurisdiction would not significantly
lighten the Supreme Court's workload.72  However, study of the
Court's practices indicates that the continuing flow of appeal cases im-
poses at least three kinds of burdens on the Justices.
First, the obligation to decide the merits of a case sometimes leads
the Court to grant plenary consideration to appeals that would have
been denied review if they had come up by certiorari. As the Justices
have pointed out, "[t]here is no necessary correlation between the diffi-
issue could provide authoritative guidance for lower courts. Nevertheless, instead of dis-
missing the writ as improvidently granted, the Justices prepared and published two opinions
that occupy a total of 25 pages in the official reports.
It is true that the Court would probably have to confront the issue sooner or later, and
that the Justices might not have to repeat the research and analysis reflected in the Johnson
opinions. But the new case would occupy another place on the plenary docket, and would
require consideration of the legal doctrines in a different factual context. See Engle v. Koeh-
ler, 707 F.2d 241, 246 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 231 (1983), afl'dmem. by an equally
divided Court, 104 S. Ct. 1673 (1984); Franklin v. Francis, 720 F.2d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.
1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2677 (1984).
68. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1721-22.
69. For example, in the 1979 Term the Court decided 270 cases on the merits. See
Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court's Exercise of Discretionary
Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 795, 804 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hellman, Discretionary
Revien]. Of these, 134 were appeals. (These figures do not include summary reconsidera-
tion orders. See Hellman, The Supreme Court's Second Thoughts: Summary Reconsideration
Orders and Denials of Review in Cases Heldfor Plenary Decisions, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hellman, Second Thoughts].)
70. See supra note 25.
71. Thus, of the 134 appeals that were decided on the merits in the 1979 Term, seesupra
note 69, only 32 received plenary consideration. Two others were disposed of summarily but
with brief opinions.
72. See, e.g., 1981 National Court Hearings, supra note 25, at 36 (1981) (remarks of
Professor Levin). In the past, I too tended to underestimate the effect of the obligatory
jurisdiction on the Court's workload. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1736-37.
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culty of the legal questions in a case and its public importance. ' 73 As a
result, the Court often feels obliged to call for full briefing and oral
argument in appeal cases that are too difficult to decide summarily but
not important enough to warrant review by certiorari standards.74 In
the 1981 Term, one out of every four cases on the plenary docket came
to the Court on appeal. While many of the cases were worthy of review
by certiorari standards, some-probably ten or more-were not.75
Second, even if the issue presented by an appeal is one that the
Supreme Court would ultimately want to decide, the particular case
may raise it prematurely or in a setting inappropriate for a definitive
resolution. Either circumstance makes the Court's job harder. If the
issue has not yet been thoroughly ventilated in the lower courts, the
process of reaching a decision and writing an opinion becomes more
difficult because the Supreme Court is deprived of the benefits of "per-
colation. ' 76 If the case is not an appropriate vehicle, not only will the
opinion be harder to write, but the decision may not settle the issues, so
that the questions will come back in somewhat different form and re-
quire additional consideration.
Finally, the obligatory jurisdiction adds to the Court's burdens
even in the cases that receive summary treatment. Whatever the prac-
tice may have been before the Court announced that summary disposi-
73. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Hearings, supra note 26, at 40 (letter signed by all nine
sitting Justices).
74. Id
75. See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic
Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982). See also Supreme Court
Jurisdiction Hearings, supra note 26, at 2 (statement from the bench by Justice Stevens,
quoted by Solicitor Gen. McCree) ("At least one of these two cases [brought by appeal from
a state court] almost certainly would not have been heard by the Court if the Court had
discretion to decide whether or not to hear it.").
In three other appeal cases in the 1981 Term, the Court unanimously reversed decisions
by single district judges that had held federal statutes unconstitutional. See Schweiker v.
Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 (1982); Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). If the obligatory jurisdiction had been abolished, these cases
would have gone to the courts of appeals, which in all likelihood would have upheld the
statutes. In that posture it is questionable whether the cases would have merited Supreme
Court review. Cf. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d
537 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984) (declining to review 8-3 decision
rejecting constitutional challenge to a section of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979); Wal-
ters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 11 (1984) (Rehnquist, Circuit Jus-
tice) (granting stay of injunction pending government's filing of appeal in Supreme Court;
noting that a single district judge declared unconstitutional a federal statute that had been
on the books for more than 120 years and that had been upheld by prior decisions).
76. For discussion of "percolation," see infra part II B.
tions were decisions on the merits,77 the Court today must give every
appeal a degree of attention and thought that need not be accorded a
certiorari petition. After all, if certiorari is denied improvidently, the
issue remains open in all other jurisdictions, and if the question is truly
worthy of review, it will return in another case. But if the Court im-
providently affirms a case on appeal,78 the effect is to establish a nation-
ally binding precedent and to discourage if not preclude further
litigation of the issue.79 Thus, the Justices must examine each jurisdic-
tional statement with at least enough care to assure themselves that af-
firmance will not settle a question that they prefer to leave open."°
D. Conclusion
Two conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, the Court's
workload has not yet reached anything resembling crisis proportions.
In the words of Justice Rehnquist, the Court is busy, "but probably no
busier than many other courts and private practitioners."'" Second,
before implementing structural change, Congress should take the un-
controversial and long-overdue step of eliminating the remaining ele-
ments of the obligatory jurisdiction. 2 Once that is done, we will have
77. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975). See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1722-
23.
78. Here and elsewhere I shall refer to dismissals for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion as affirmances; certainly they are in effect. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1722 n.57.
79. See Sidle v. Majors, 429 U.S. 945, 949-50 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
80. The obligatory jurisdiction also imposes another kind of burden: that of determin-
ing whether cases have properly been brought as appeals. Particularly in cases from state
courts, the scope of the appeal jurisdiction depends on rules that are not always easy to
apply. In the 1980 Term, 80 state court appeals were decided summarily on the merits; 47
others were found to have been improperly brought as appeals. 1981 National Court Hear-
ings, supra note 25, at 185 (report by Congressional Research Service on Supreme Court's
mandatory jurisdiction). Determining which cases fell into each category took time and
effort that would not have been necessary if the obligatory jurisdiction had been abolished.
81. Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 6.
82. I recognize that the legislation would not eliminate every vestige of the obligatory
jurisdiction, but the remaining fragments would be of such small moment, from the stand-
point of workload, that for the sake of convenience I use the term without qualification.
The description of the legislation as uncontroversial is based on the public record. See,
e.g., Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Abolition of Civil Priorities; Ju-
rors Rights. Hearings on H..A 2406, 4395, & 4396 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties andthe Administration oJustice of the House Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
41 (statement of Judge Eimo B. Hunter on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United
States); 130 CONG. REc. H9288 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier)
("There is no known opposition."); 125 CONG. REC. S7633 (1979) (remarks of Sen. DeCon-
cini) ("[In questions to the witnesses attempting to identify any group of people who might
object to this legislation, we could not find any."); infra note 83. However, I have been
informed that some members of the Senate Judiciary Committee believe that a state should
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the opportunity to see how the Court manages its docket on a wholly
discretionary basis. If, after a few years, the workload proves to be
truly burdensome, there will be no alternative to structural reform; but
Congress, the bar, and the public will have had that much more time to
consider the merits of various possible solutions.
83
II. The Problem of Disuniformity
To say that the Court's workload does not justify creation of a new
tribunal is not to say that the Justices could reasonably be expected to
increase the number of cases that receive plenary consideration, and
indeed no one takes that view. 4 Thus, the stronger argument for struc-
tural change rests on the assertion that "additional decisional capacity"
is needed to secure uniformity and consistency in federal law.
To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to answer four questions.
First, to what extent is there disuniformity in the law today as a result
of the limited number of cases the Supreme Court can decide on the
merits? Second, how has the lack of "appellate capacity" affected those
who must conform their conduct to federal precedents-judges decid-
ing cases in the lower courts, lawyers advising clients, and citizens car-
rying out their everyday activities? Third, how effective would the
proposed new court be in reducing the existing uncertainty? Finally,
how would the availability of the reference option affect the Supreme
be able to seek review as of right in the Supreme Court when a federal court of appeals has
struck down a state statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1982), and that the Federal Government
should have an appeal as of right when a federal statute has been invalidated, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1252 (1982). I therefore note that the Court would obtain substantial relief even if those
classes of cases were excluded from the jurisdictional reform. See 1981 National Court
Hearings, supra note 25, at 184 (report by Congressional Research Service).
83. In September 1984, the House, without dissent, approved the Supreme Court
Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction Reform Act of 1984, substantially eliminating the remain-
ing elements of the obligatory jurisdiction. H.R. 5644, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC.
H9287-89 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1984). Similar legislation is pending in the Senate, but at this
writing it remains in committee. S. 385, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. S894 (daily
ed. Feb. 2, 1983); S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-07, 129 CONG. REc. 51947-49 (daily
ed. Mar. 1, 1983). (The substance of the legislation has been approved by the Subcommittee
on Courts both as a separate bill (S. 385) and as part of the same bill that would create the
Intercircuit Tribunal (S. 645). See 129 CONG. REC. at D923 (daily ed. June 29, 1983).)
84. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 10, at 231 (quoting Justice White); Rehnquist Letter,
supra note 10, at 2. Perhaps the suggestion should not be dismissed so quickly, however.
Arguably the Court would better fulfill its lawmaking function-without increasing its total
workload-if it were to hear more cases and write shorter opinions, i.e., address one set of
facts at a time rather than treat an entire area of law in a lengthy essay strewn with dicta.
Compare, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (25-page opinion with 52 footnotes dealing with antitrust
standing), with H.S. Crocker Co. v. Ostrofe, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), vacating 670 F.2d 1378
(9th Cir. 1982) (summarily vacating decision on antitrust standing).
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Court's performance of the work it would not delegate? The first two
questions are addressed in the pages that follow. The last two are ad-
dressed in parts III and IV, respectively, of this Article.
A. Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts
In introducing the bill to create an Intercircuit Tribunal, Senator
Dole asserted that the proposed court would "provide desperately
needed additional decisional capacity for the resolution of disputes
where nationwide uniformity is needed, many of which are now left
unresolved because the Supreme Court cannot make room on its
docket."85 In a similar vein, Congressman Kastenmeier stated that
hundreds of petitions from the courts of appeals are denied review even
though some "identify serious conflicts between circuits."86 Other sup-
porters of the proposed new court have made arguments along the
same lines.87 The clear implication is that the Supreme Court is deny-
ing review in such a large number of conflict cases, with such a substan-
tial impact on consistency in the law, that the need for additional
decisional capacity has reached the point of desperation. It is therefore
appropriate to focus initially on intercircuit conflicts and the Supreme
Court's role in resolving them.
A conflict exists when two or more appellate courts have attached
different legal consequences to facts that are identical in all relevant
respects.88 Failure to resolve a conflict may have three undesirable re-
85. 129 CONG. Rnc. S1948 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
86. Id at HI 193 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
87. See, e.g., Cutler, Help for High Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1982, at A19, cots. 2-5;
Hefin, supra note 14, at 18 ("While there is no definitive study, it would appear that there
are over 1,000 existing conflicts.").
88. There may appear to be an element of question-begging in this formulation, inas-
much as the very question dividing the parties--especially at the stage when certiorari is
sought-may well be that of whether or not the conceded factual differences are indeed
"relevant" in the sense of justifying disparate results in superficially similar cases. For the
most part, I am content to assume that the differences are relevant if at least one of the
courts (or, if review is granted, the Supreme Court) states or clearly implies that they are.
See, eg., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356, 1362 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Consider-
ing the peculiarities of [an arguably inconsistent Eighth Circuit decision] and in light of [a
later Eighth Circuit decision], there is no indication that the Eighth Circuit would reach a
result contrary to that which we reach today. If it would reach such a result, by this opinion
which creates no conflict we must respectfully disagree. "), cert. grantea 104 S. Ct. 1590
(1984).
This approach derives from basic doctrines of precedent, considered in light of the rea-
sons why we care about conflicts. That is, as long as one court indicates that the result might
be different if the facts were those of the supposedly conflicting decision, future courts in
that jurisdiction will be free to follow the other court's holding when it is on point. From the
standpoint of planning and litigation, the situation differs only in degree from what it would
be if the court had not spoken at all. Compare, ag., United States v. Gonzales, 555 F.2d 308,
Spring 1984] DO WE NEED 11. WILL IT WORK?
394 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 11:375
sults. First, the ideal of equality is violated when similarly situated per-
sons in different parts of the country receive disparate treatment
because two courts have attached different meanings to the same na-
tional law. Second, the recorded disagreement will encourage fur-
ther-and often wasteful-litigation of the identical issue in the circuits
or states where the question has not been decided. Finally, because
people in those jurisdictions will have no way of knowing which rule
will be applied to their transactions, intelligent planning and negotia-
tion will be frustrated. Thus, if the Supreme Court were leaving large
numbers of conflicts unresolved because its docket was too full,89 the
316-17 (2d Cir. 1977) (introduction into evidence of out-of-court confession by codefendant
violated rule of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), even though confession did not
name defendant, when confession was "directly" inculpatory and other evidence was "en-
tirely circumstantial"), with English v. United States, 620 F.2d 150, 152-53 (7th Cir.) (no
Bruton violation; court distinguished Gonzales on ground that context of statement permitted
inculpatory inference but did not compel it), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 859 (1980); and United
States v. Key, 725 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 1984) (codefendant's out-of-court confession
was improperly admitted into evidence; court, citing Gonzales with approval, found that
statement "directly incriminated Key and formed a crucial part of the government's proof').
Similarly, the court that handed down the earlier decision may, without overruling its
own precedent, choose to follow the rule of the other circuit's case when the fact pattern of
the latter actually comes before it. Compare, e.g., United States v. Vega, 447 F.2d 698 (2d
Cir. 1971) (holding that defendant in criminal case may waive right to 12-person jury), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972), andUnited States v. Scalzitti, 578 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 1978)
(Government urged Third Circuit to follow rule of Vega; however, the court, "[w]ithout
accepting or rejecting the validity of the holding in Vega in other circumstances," found that
the reasoning of Vega was "not. . .applicable" to a case involving defendant's waiver of
unanimous verdict), with United States v. Pachay, 711 F.2d 488, 491-93 (2d Cir. 1983) (in
case involving waiver of unanimity, court recognized "undeniable similarity" to Vega, but
found "factual differences that have legal significance" and adopted view of Third Circuit in
Scalzitti); compare United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1057-61 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that substitution of alternate juror after jury deliberations have begun requires reversal only
if defendant shows prejudice; court apparently viewed Ninth Circuit decision in United
States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1975), as requiring reversal per se, but also noted
that "unlike the situation in Lamb there is no suggestion in the record of a coercive effect on
the alternate juror"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2431 (1983), with United States v. Rubio, 727
F.2d 786, 799 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984) (dictum) (Ninth Circuit refused to read Lamb as holding
that postsubmission substitution is prejudicial error per se; stated that reversal "would be
pointless where there is no reasonable possibility that the alternate jurors in any manner
affected the verdict"); and United States v. Crisco, 725 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Ninth Circuit held that verdict was not tainted by substitution of alternate juror, court
distinguished Lamb as involving "particularly unusual factual situation suggesting imper-
missible coercion upon the alternate juror after the substitution occurred"), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 2360 (1984). For further discussion, see infra section C.
89. There are many other reasons why the Court might deny review in a case involving
a conflict. See infra text accompanying notes 115-21; Helman, Discretionary Review, supra
note 69, at 869.
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need for additional decisional capacity would be difficult to deny.90
But where is the evidence? 91 Where is a list of fifty cases in which
the Court, during a recent Term, has denied review despite the pres-
ence of a conflict? Where are thirty unreviewed conflicts? Where are
twenty? I have read all of the statements submitted to House and Sen-
ate subcommittees over the last three years in support of the Intercir-
cuit Tribunal and similar proposals, and with one exception, no one
has even attempted to compile such a list.92 The exception is Arizona
attorney John Frank. Testifying in the spring of 1983, Mr. Frank iden-
tified a total of twenty cases from three Terms in which one or more
Justices dissented from the denial of certiorari on the ground that the
Court was failing to resolve a conflict. 93 To say the least, that is less
than an overwhelming showing of inadequate capacity.94
Within the Court, the most persistent advocate of the view that
intercircuit conflicts remain unresolved because the Court "cannot
make room on its docket" 95 has been Justice White.9 6 A casual reader
of the weekly order lists might get the impression that Justice White
has identified a substantial number of cases in which the Court has
90. Some opponents of the Intercircuit Tribunal might not concede this point. See, e.g.,
Stevens, JudicialRestraint, supra note 16, at 183; Wallace, The Nature andExtent oflntercir-
cult Conflicts: 4 Solution Neededfor a Mountain or a Molehill 71 CALIF. L. Rrv. 913, 930-
31(1983).
91. The two most comprehensive empirical studies were conducted nearly a decade ago,
and they came to very different conclusions. Compare HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 2, at 91-111, 67 F.R.D. at 298-324, with G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 87-
92.
92. In addition to published materials, I have examined the statements submitted to the
Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Judiciary Committee at hearings held on March II
and April 8, 1983; and statements submitted to the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice of the House Judiciary Committee at hearings held on
April 27, May 18, Sept. 22, and Nov. 10, 1983.
93. J. Frank, Statement Re H.R. 1970, The Intercircuit Tribunal Bill, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, May 18, 1983 (Exhibit B) [hereinafter cited as Frank Statement].
94. One other witness, Chief Judge John C. Godbold of the Eleventh Circuit, presented
a report based on a staff attorney research project in his circuit. In a sample of 200 cases
randomly selected from among the 1,200 published opinions handed down by the circuit in
a single year, the staff attorneys found 15 that either initiated or continued an intercircuit
conflict. However, Judge Godbold did not identify the cases, nor did he indicate whether
the Supreme Court had been asked to review any of them. The raw numbers-and the
extrapolations from them--thus tell us very little about the need for additional decisional
capacity. See infra note 108.
95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., Novack Investment Co. v. Setser, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981) (White J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Bailey v. Weinberger, 419 U.S. 953 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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denied review despite the presence of a conflict. But careful counting
reveals that in the 1982 Term Justice White published only thirteen
opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari on that ground, and in
two of those cases other members of the Court filed concurring opin-
ions disputing Justice White's contention that a conflict existed.97 In
the 1981 Term Justice White published twelve conflict-based opinions
dissenting from the denial of certiorari. Two involved the same issue;98
two others involved issues that were resolved in the 1982 Term.9 9 And
study of all unreviewed cases in the 1980 Term in which Justice White
filed a dissenting notation of any kind yields no more than fifteen in
which the decision below appeared to conflict with the ruling of an-
other appellate court.lt°
97. See Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Illinois, 459 U.S. 1049 (1982) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in the denial of certiorari); Castorr v. Brundage, 459 U.S. 928 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari). (The issue raised by the latter case was resolved in
the 1983 Term. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892, 897 n.6
(1984).) Another of Justice White's dissents involved an issue that was resolved later in the
1982 Term; indeed, the order denying certiorari was vacated and the case remanded for
reconsideration in light of the intervening decision. Compare Simmons v. Sea-Land Servs.,
Inc., 459 U.S. 931 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), with Pallas Ship-
ping Agency, Ltd. v. Duris, 461 U.S. 529 (1983), and Simmons v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 103
S. Ct. 3079 (1983), vacating 676 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1982). Still another of Justice White's
issues was resolved in the 1983 Term. Compare Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 459
U.S. 1007 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), with Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984). Another conflict was eliminated when the
nonconforming circuit overruled its precedents and adopted the standard followed by other
courts of appeals. Compare Romero v. United States, 459 U.S. 926 (1983) (White, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari), with Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.
1983); see also Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
98. Baxter v. Mouzavires, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Chelsea House Publishers v. Nichostone Book Bindery, 455 U.S. 994 (1982)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
99. Compare Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 997 (1982) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari), with NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462
U.S. 393 (1983); compare Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 454 U.S. 1110 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari), with Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983).
100. There were only five cases in which a dissent by Justice White explicitly adverted to
the existence of a conflict. Another dozen or so cases involved recurring issues, and in per-
haps half of those there appears to have been a conflict of some sort.
During the three Terms 1977 through 1979, Justice White identified 21 issues which he
asserted were being denied review despite the presence of a conflict. See Helman, Discre-
tionary Review, supra note 69, at 867. As of November 1, 1982, five of those conflicts had
been resolved. See id at 868 n.372. By April 1, 1984, four additional issues had been settled.
Compare Thomas v. New York, 444 U.S. 891 (1979) (White, J., dissenting from dismissal of
appeal), with South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); compare Burke v. New Jersey
Educ. Ass'n, 439 U.S. 894 (1978) (discussed in Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S.
1014, 1019 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)), with Migra v. Warren
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984); compare Guiffre v. United States, 439
U.S. 833 (1978) (discussed in Atcon, 439 U.S. at 1018-19 (White, J., dissenting)), with Bell v.
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Of course, we cannot charge Justice White with the responsibility
of making a public announcement every time the Court denies review
despite a conflict. But the paucity of dissents, in the face of his strong
advocacy, casts strong doubt on the likelihood that the unreviewed
cases teem with unresolved intercircuit disagreements.
Another kind of circumstantial evidence points even more strongly
to the conclusion that the number of conflicts presented to the Supreme
Court has not yet outstripped the Court's capacity to resolve them. Cu-
riously, it is a point that has been emphasized by some supporters of
the proposed new court: the fact that in each of the last few Terms,
about forty cases involving conflicts have received plenary considera-
tion.10' But those who cite this figure as evidence of the inadequacy of
the present system appear to forget that the total number of cases on
the plenary docket during this period was 140 to 150 a Term. In other
words, less than one-third of the cases on the plenary docket were de-
voted to resolving intercircuit conflicts.
What were the other cases? Some dealt with recurring issues that
had not yet given rise to a conflict. Some involved questions of first
impression; in others the Court reviewed court of appeals decisions that
struck down federal government practices or policies. Some were ap-
peal cases that would never have reached the plenary docket if the
Court had had the discretion to refuse review on the merits.'02
I readily concede that many-perhaps most-of the non-conflict
cases clearly deserved review for other reasons. Included in this group
are cases in which the court below held a federal statute unconstitu-
tional; cases involving disputes between sovereigns (state against state,
or a state against the federal government); and cases in which a lower
court interpreted the law in a way that would require the federal gov-
ernment to abandon or modify a policy of widespread applicability. 0 3
But in each Term there were twenty to thirty cases in which the grant of
review would be difficult to justify-and difficult to understand- if the
United States, 462 U.S. 356 (1983); compare Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. I01 1 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), with Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149
(2d Cir. 1983). Another of Justice White's conffict issues was resolved later in the 1983
Term. Compare Lewin v. New Jersey, 444 U.S. 905 (1979) (White, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari), with Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984).
101. See, e.g., O'Connor Comments, supra note 21, at 13; Burger, Opening Remarks, 60
A.L.I. PROc. 32, 37 (1983).
102. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
103. See Hellman, Discretionary Review, supra note 69, at 863-64.
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Court was turning down petitions in cases that did present genuine
conflicts. i0 4
We know that the Justices attach great importance to resolving in-
tercircuit disagreements.10 5 There are cases that would never reach the
plenary docket otherwise.'0 6 Thus the fact that the Justices took so
many marginally certworthy cases rather than resolving some addi-
tional conflicts is strong evidence that there were no other conflicts-or
at least none that the Justices thought were ripe for resolution.1
0 7
At first blush, it might seem quite incredible that the total number
of intercircuit conflicts reaching the Supreme Court would be no more
than forty or fifty a year.' 0 8 After all, over the last few decades, Con-
gress has substantially added to the body of federal statutes; the
104. See, e.g., California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); United States v. Hasting, 461
U.S. 499 (1983); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Marshall v. Lonberger,
459 U.S. 422 (1983).
105. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 182, 67 F.R.D. at 402 (letter of
Justice White).
106. See, e.g., Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660 (1983) (Government, as respondent,
conceded conflict but argued that the decision rejecting its position was "so clearly aberra-
tional" that the issue did not require Supreme Court resolution, Memorandum in Opposi-
tion at 3; Court granted review anyway and affirmed unanimously); Standefer v. United
States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) (Government, as respondent, conceded conflict but urged Court to
deny review on ground that the decision below was correct and the contrary holdings were
"isolated deviations," Brief in Opposition at 9; Court granted certiorari anyway and af-
firmed unanimously); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (Government, as respon-
dent, conceded conflict but urged Court to deny review because petitioner would lose under
either of the competing rules, Brief in Opposition at 6; Court granted certiorari anyway and
affirmed unanimously).
107. In a letter arguing that the need for additional decisional capacity "has not been
demonstrated," Justice Stevens stated that of the approximately 1,000 cases the Court re-
viewed at its September 1983 conference, there were only 3 or 4 in which the Court denied
certiorari but which might have been referred to a new tribunal. All were intercircuit con-
flict cases. Stevens Letter, supra note 9. See infra note 209.
108. The analysis in the text takes no account of intercircuit conflicts that do not reach
the Supreme Court. This omission is deliberate; in assessing the adequacy of the national
appellate capacity, there is no reason to give weight to the existence of unsettled questions
that the present system has not had an opportunity to resolve. See Alsup, supra note 2, at
438.
I am aware of the view that there is a "hidden docket"-"cases in which counsel
[chooses] not to seek review only because the probability of a decision on the merits is too
low to warrant the expense." HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 7, 67 F.R.D. at
211. But considering the volume of patently uncertworthy petitions filed each year, it is hard
to believe that very many of the cases in which petitions are not filed are of the kind that
would be heard by the Court if only there were more room on the docket. And in a case
involving an actual conflict, it would strain credulity to suggest that a lawyer would refrain
from seeking review because he thought it so unlikely that the Court would grant it. If a
lawyer decides not to file a certiorari petition notwithstanding the presence of a conflict, the
more likely reason is that the probable benefit to his client of a favorable decision on the
merits does not warrant the additional expense and delay of taking the case to the Supreme
Court. And if that is so, the lawyer would behave no differently if the Intercircuit Tribunal
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number of circuits has been enlarged; and the volume of appellate liti-
gation has grown enormously.
But these developments do not necessarily bring about a propor-
tionate increase in the number of conflicts. For one thing, when Con-
gress establishes a new regulatory program or adds to the roster of
federal claims, it often borrows language, concepts, or procedures from
existing laws. Questions of interpretation that might originally have
been doubtful enough to give rise to a conflict can be readily resolved
in reliance on precedents construing the earlier legislation.1"9 Even
when Congress does not follow that route, it now has a pretty good idea
of the kinds of issues that give rise to conflicts and uncertainty, and can
address them in language that leaves substantially less room for litiga-
tion. For example, the courts have been struggling for forty years with
questions of preemption under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). In contrast, the preemption issues under the Employees Re-
tirement and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) are much narrower and
should be resolved much more quickly because Congress dealt with the
problem in a broadly preemptive provision coupled with some specific
exceptions. 1 0
Nor can it be assumed that every ambiguity in federal law will
necessarily, or even probably, give rise to a conflict requiring the
Supreme Court's attention. One reason is that the courts of appeals
generally attempt to avoid intercircuit disagreements, especially on
statutory questions, if they can conscientiously do so."' More impor-
tant, as new issues arise, old ones lose their currency. Some become
were in existence; in fact, he might be even more reluctant to file for review because of the
fear that he would have to litigate in two additional forums.
In this light, it becomes apparent that counting conflict cases in the lower courts, with-
out ascertaining how many of them were denied review by the Supreme Court, tells us very
little about the need for a new court with reference jurisdiction. The position would be
different if Congress were giving serious consideration to the Hruska Commission's proposal
for a transfer jurisdiction that would permit recurring issues to be resolved definitively at the
first level of review. See HRUsKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-38, 67 F.R.D. at
241-46. However, that aspect of the Commission's plan received virtually no support, and
no one today endorses it. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1717 n.32.
109. For example, many issues that might otherwise have arisen in the interpretation of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 will be controlled by precedents inter-
preting the Fair Labor Standards Act or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
110. Thus, in the 1982 Term, the Court divided 5-1-3 in a preemption case involving the
NLRA, but issued a unanimous opinion resolving several preemption issues involving ER-
ISA. Compare Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983) (NLRA), with Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (ERISA).
I 1l. See, e.g., Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983); Al-
dens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980). See
also cases cited infra note 112.
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settled through the accumulation of precedents in the lower courts, as
consensus replaces discord without the need for Supreme Court inter-
vention.1 2 Some become irrelevant through developments in the law
or in the activity being regulated. For example, ambiguities in federal
statutes may be eliminated by new legislation;1 13 controversies over the
112. See, e.g., United States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (dis-
avowing earlier decision and adopting view of all other circuits that had considered the
question); Raley's, Inc. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Trapnell v. United
States, 725 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1983) (abandoning "farce and mockery" test for competence of
defendant's attorney in criminal trial; adopting instead the "reasonably competent assist-
ance" standard previously adopted by all other circuits and most state courts); Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Cargill, Inc., 709 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1983) (en
bane) (overruling prior decisions and eliminating intercircuit conflict); City of West Chicago
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 701 F.2d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[alfter
reconsideration," abandoning position rejected by three other circuits); Copper Liquor, Inc.
v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (overruling case that created
intercircuit conflict); United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 956-65 (5th Cir. 1983) (en
banc) (overruling prior decisions and adopting rule followed in eight other circuits that had
considered the question). Compare Petition for Rehearing at 2, Butler v. United States, 455
U.S. 945 (1982), denying cert. to 660 F.2d 23 (2nd Cir. 1981) (petitioner pointed to conflict
with panel decision of Sixth Circuit), with United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir.
1982) (en banc court overruled panel and brought Sixth Circuit into harmony with all other
circuits that had considered the issue); compare United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 728
F.2d 648, 652-53 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting intercircuit conflict on the authority of a district
court to require a corporation, as a condition of probation, to pay money to a non-aggrieved
private entity; accepting the view of the Tenth Circuit and rejecting the position of the
Eighth Circuit), with United States v. Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir.
1984) (en banc) (overruling panel decision and accepting the position of the Fourth and
Tenth Circuits, thus eliminating the conflict).
113. Compare, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Black, 717 F.2d 1280, 1288-92 (9th Cir.
1983) (rejecting Benefits Review Board's holding that, for occupational diseases, date of last
exposure is "time of injury" for purpose of establishing "average weekly wage" on basis of
which compensation is computed), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1910 (1984), with 130 CONG. REC.
H9592, H9599-9600 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1984) (conference committee report on amendments
to statute) (clarifying "time of injury" and rejecting Benefits Review Board's interpretation),
andid at S 11627 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1984) (adopting conference committee report and clear-
ing the measure for the President); compare Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (noting intercircuit conflict on question whether, under Equal Access to Justice Act,
Federal Government can avoid liability for attorney's fees as long as its litigation position
was "substantially justified," or whether its position in the underiying action must also have
been "substantially justified"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984), with H.R 5479, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H9297 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1984) (amending statute to make
clear that "position" includes agency actions that led to litigation), and 130 CONG. REC.
H9302 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1984) (legislation approved by House on suspension of rules);
compare United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir.) (rejecting Ninth Circuit decision
holding that misuse of credit card account numbers does not violate federal law prohibiting
credit card fraud), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 126 (1983), with Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2183 (to be codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (credit card
fraud includes misuse of account number). See also, e.g., Catholic Medical Center v. New
Hampshire-Vermont Hospitalization Serv., Inc., 707 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1983) (circuits divided
on whether cost of providing free medical care to indigents is reimbursable as a proper
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interpretation of Enabling Act procedural rules may be mooted by clar-
ifying amendments."t 4 Finally, as will be discussed more fully below,
there are many issues which for one reason or another are just not
likely to give rise to conflicting decisions. Thus, even though the
United States Code may occupy an ever-larger space on the shelf, the
number of questions on which the courts of appeals actually differ may
remain relatively stable.
It is also important to keep in mind that considerations other than
docket pressures may lead the Supreme Court to deny review in cases
that do involve intercircuit conflicts. The Court might conclude that
the result in the particular case would be the same no matter which of
the conflicting rules were followed."' Or the "percolation" process" 16
may not have run its course; for example, the conflicting decisions may
Medicare cost; 1982 legislation mooted question- by explicitly barring reimbursement);
United States v. Gelb, 700 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1983) (circuits divided on scope of 1970 legisla-
tion; 1982 law eliminated ambiguity); CRC Corp. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.
1982) (tax treatment of deductions by limited partner in oil and gas drilling partnership
litigated in three circuits; issue resolved prospectively by 1978 legislation), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2453 (1983); 130 CONG. REC. S 10938-39 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1984) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (proposing legislation to transfer certain enforcement authority to Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, thus mooting intercircuit conflict on validity of identical
reorganization plan under prior law). Cf. Heckler v. Turner, 105 S. Ct. 2, 3 (1984) (Rehn-
quist, Circuit Justice) (1984 amendment to Aid to Families with Dependent Children statute
resolved, "at least for the future," the intercircuit conflict on which the Court had granted
certiorari).
114. Compare, e.g., United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1983) (expressing
doubt as to correctness of position taken by other circuits, but deciding case on other
grounds) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 721 (1984), with COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TiHE FED. RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 98 F.R.D. 381, 407 (1983).
115. See, e.g., Gold v. National Savings Bank, 641 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 826 (1981) (petitioner accurately pointed to intercircuit conflict on issue of whether
federal or state law controls determination whether evidence in diversity case is sufficient to
go to jury; however, court below, in acknowledging conflict, had emphasized that applica-
tion of either rule mandated judgment for defendant); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cerf. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981) (petitioner claimed in-
tercircuit conflict on whether certain restraints imposed by manufacturer on distributors are
"horizontal" or "vertical"; court of appeals and district court applied different tests, but
agreed that restraints were "vertical" and lawful). Cf. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d
149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983) (Second Circuit, in adjudicating criminal defendants' claims of inef-
fective assistance of counsel, had applied a verbal standard seemingly more tolerant than the
one followed in all other circuits; however, the choice of standard did not affect the results in
any of court's published decisions, including some in which the Supreme Court denied certi-
orari).
The underlying premise, of course, is that notwithstanding its unique role as arbiter of
the national law, the Supreme Court remains a court, and an Article III court at that. As
such it can lay down legal rules only as an incident of the function of deciding cases. See
Hellman, Discretionary Review, supra note 69, at 796 & n.5.
116. See infra notes 130-36 & accompanying text.
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have been issued almost simultaneously, so that neither court had the
opportunity to consider the other's position.' 7 Or the attorneys may
have done "a poor job of advocacy.""" Or the record may be
"cloudy,"'' 9 or the important issue entangled with questions of lesser
magnitude. 20 In any of these situations, the Justices might well decide
to wait for another case that will provide a better "vehicle"'' for reso-
lution of the conflict. And if the issue is truly a recurring one, the delay
should not be great.
B. Potential Conflicts and "Sideswipes"
In evaluating the asserted need for additional decisional capacity,
I have concentrated on the Supreme Court's role in resolving intercir-
cuit conflicts. I have shown that notwithstanding the limited number of
cases the Justices can decide on the merits, the available evidence indi-
cates that the Court is resolving all, or almost all, of the actual conflicts
presented to it. The next-and much more difficult-question is
whether the resolution of actual conflicts is enough to enable the Court
to adequately perform its function of fostering uniformity and clarity in
the national law, or whether that role requires the Court to hear a more
broadly defined class of cases. The answer to that question has both an
empirical and an analytical component.
In an attempt to obtain direct evidence of the need for additional
appellate capacity, I undertook to examine a large selection of cases in
which review was denied in the 1981 Term. The object of the study
was to determine how many of the cases presented genuine conflicts.'22
Thus far the research has not yielded publishable data in the form of
117. Compare, e.g., Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981)
(rejecting "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) defense to age discrimination suit
by would-be airline pilot), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1007 (1982), with Murnane v. American
Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (accepting BFOQ defense on virtually identical
facts), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). The two decisions were issued within two weeks of
one another. See also infra note 120.
118. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 918 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
119. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
120. See, e.g., Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (court
accepted "bona fide occupational qualification" defense to would-be pilot's age discrimina-
tion suit, thus creating conflict with Fourth Circuit, see supra note 117; however, court also
held that the applicant "would not have been hired in any event since he was not competi-
tively qualified," 667 F.2d at 102), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
121. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 461 n.3 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. The study was confined to a single Term because the kind of analysis required is so
time-consuming.
hard numbers, but the process of examining scores of certiorari peti-
tions has provided the empirical foundation for what I believe to be a
sound analytical approach.
I have already pointed out that many of the cases brought to the
Court involve no more than the application of established rules to par-
ticular facts. 23 Let us put those cases to one side (for the moment)124
and look only at the petitions that raise issues of law. Of those, a large
number will not even assert the existence of an intercircuit conflict.
125
And because most lawyers-and even many pro se petitioners-are
aware that the presence of a conflict is the "cue" most likely to lead to
the grant of review,126 it is generally safe to assume that where no con-
flict is claimed, none exists. Let us then consider the particular circum-
stances that may underlie the conclusion that no conflict is present.
First, there may be no other cases on point. If so, the reason may
be that the precise problem arises very infrequently; and if that is true,
there is little justification for the Supreme Court to devote its time to an
issue that no other court is likely to confront in the foreseeable
future.127
Next, suppose that there are several decisions on point, and all
have reached the same result. That may be because the answer is obvi-
ous, and any competent lawyer would confidently predict that future
courts will follow in the same path.128 A Supreme Court ruling would
123. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
124. See infra section C.
125. My own research is not yet advanced enough to provide solid figures for the 1980's,
but in a study of the 1971 through 1973 Terms, Dean Casper and Judge Posner found that
less than 25% of the applications for review alleged a conflict. G. CASPER & R. POSNER,
supra note 32, at 87. Professor Feeney's study, based on a larger sample drawn from the
1971 and 1972 Terms, found that conflicts were claimed in about one-third of the cases in
which review was denied. HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 96, 67 F.R.D. at
305.
126. See generally R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 60 at 264-73; Hellman, supra
note 59, at 624.
127. On the other hand, if the question, though novel, is one that can be expected to
recur, the desirability of a Supreme Court decision will depend in the first instance on
whether or not the question has an obvious answer. If it does, the situation is analytically
equivalent to the ones described in the next paragraph of text. If it does not, the issue can be
assimilated with those that have given rise to multiple decisions without a conflict-though
the desirability of "percolation" will usually be even clearer when the case is one of first
impression. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
128. Many of the issues raised by tax protesters fall into this category. See, e.g., United
States v. Koliboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Courts too numerous to enumerate
have rejected this silly claim" that the Internal Revenue Code is not encompassed within the
general-federal-question grant of jurisdiction to the district courts).
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add little to what the bar and other lower courts would assume in any
event. 129
Now suppose that the issue has been adjudicated in several juris-
dictions and, although all of the courts have reached the same result, it
cannot be said that the answer is obvious. Perhaps there have been
dissenting opinions, or perhaps the courts themselves have indicated
that they regard the question as difficult. In this situation there is a
good possibility that the issue will eventually merit the attention of the
Supreme Court. Even so, the Justices will usually be well advised,
from the standpoint of reaching sound decisions, to wait for an actual
conflict before addressing the question. A contrary voice-whether or
not it is ultimately persuasive-can illuminate a problem in a way that
a series of generally harmonious opinions cannot. Sometimes the non-
conforming decision will reveal flaws in the reasoning of the courts that
considered the question initially. 3 ° At other times the unpersuasive-
ness of the later decision will provide reassurance that the first cases
reached the correct result after all.' 3 ' In either situation, the Court
benefits from the judicial system's analogue to the adversary process-
though with the additional and crucial element that the opposing per-
spectives come from two or more disinterested courts, each of which
must justify its position through reasoning that will have the force of
law. Moreover, by looking at the various decisions applying the com-
peting rules, the Court can get a sense of how each works in practice
129. I put to one side the very serious problems raised by the Federal Government's
practice of relitigating an issue without seeking certiorari even after its position has been
rejected in several circuits. In that situation a Supreme Court decision would certainly make
a significant contribution to uniformity in the law, but because of the Government's litiga-
tion policy the Court does not get a chance to address the issue. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores
Co. v. Williamson, 549 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (8th Cir. 1977) (Lay, J., concurring). It is true
that the Solicitor General, in deciding whether to seek review, probably takes into account
the fact that the Court can hear only a limited number of cases; on the other hand, these
issues do seem to reach the Court eventually. Compare HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 133-43, 67 F.R.D. at 349-61, with NLRB v. Enter. Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters,
429 U.S. 507 (1977), and Bayside Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977). Thus it is not
clear whether the problem (apart from Government intransigence) is truly one of inadequate
decisional capacity or is more a matter of timing. See generally United States v. Mendoza,
104 S. Ct. 568 (1984).
130. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984) (unanimously
affirming decision that rejected interpretation of statute adopted by the four courts of ap-
peals that initially considered the question); Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557
(1983) (unanimously affirming decision that rejected holdings by first two circuits to address
issue); Bayside Enter., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298 (1977) (same); Otte v. United States, 419
U.S. 43 (1974) (unanimously affirming decision rejecting both of the two alternate positions
taken by the circuits that initially addressed the issue).
131. See, e.g., Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191 (1980) (unanimously reversing
decision that declined to follow earlier holdings by two other circuits).
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and thus be in a better position to make an informed choice between
them.
1 32
Some lawyers appear to assume that the desirability of speedy res-
olution and the probable gain from additional "percolation" are in-
dependent values that compete with and must be weighed against one
another. 33 But that is not necessarily so. The certainty that is sup-
posed to come from speedy resolution may prove illusory if a prema-
ture decision raises more questions than it answers. At best the Court
will forthrightly modify the view it took before the additional consider-
ations were brought to its attention. At worst the Court will retain the
rule but hedge it about with so many qualifications and subrules that
the law becomes more confused than it was before the initial deci-
132. For example, in the 1980 Term the Court declined to review a Seventh Circuit deci-
sion holding that the sale of a business through the transfer of stock does not fall within the
coverage of the federal securities laws when the "economic reality" of the transaction is
"commercial" rather than "investment." Fredericksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981). Clearly the issue was doubtful and recurring; the court
below, after distinguishing a similar case in which the Fourth Circuit had upheld coverage,
see 637 F.2d at 1151-52, had gone on to question the "method of analysis" followed by the
other circuit, id at 1152 n.2. But neither opinion analyzed the issue in any depth. There was
no examination of the legislative history, no reference to scholarly commentary, and little
analysis of the policy considerations.
Over the next three years, the issue was litigated extensively. Several courts followed
the lead of the Seventh Circuit in applying what came to be called the "sale of business"
doctrine. See, e.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982). However, the Second
Circuit, after analyzing the precedents and the policy considerations, rejected the doctrine.
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982) (2-1 decision). Stimulated by this "em-
phatic" repudiation, the Seventh Circuit "consider[ed] the doctrine yet again." Sutter v.
Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir. 1982). The court reviewed the Second Circuit's criti-
cisms, took note of an intervening Supreme Court decision on a related issue, and adhered
to its position. The controversy also generated a large body of academic commentary.
Some of the writers endorsed the doctrine, while others attacked it. See Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 731 F.2d 1348, 1351 n.2 (9th Cir. 1984) (collecting authorities), cert.
granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1984).
The question did not return to the Supreme Court until 1984. The Court (after seeking
the views of the Solicitor General) seized the opportunity and granted review. Seagrave
Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 710 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2341
(1984). As fate would have it, that case was dismissed by stipulation, see 105 S. Ct. 23
(1984), but two other cases presenting the issue had already been filed. See Ruefenacht v.
O'Halloran, 737 F.2d 320 (3d Cir. 1984),petdtionfor cert. fledsub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht,
53 U.S.L.W. 3115 (U.S. July 27, 1984) (No. 84-165); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 731
F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984), petitionfor cert.filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3908 (U.S. May 31, 1984) (No.
83-1961). In November 1984, the Court agreed to hear both cases. Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 53 U.S.L.W. 3365 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1984); Gould v. Ruefenacht, 52 U.S.L.W. 3365
(U.S. Nov. 13, 1984).
133. See, e.g., HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 15, 67 F.R.D. at 219 (quot-
ing Dean Griswold). But see 1 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate Sys-
tem, Hearings Second Phase 87 (testimony of Dean Wolfman) (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Hruska Commission Hearings].
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sion.134 It is no accident that Justices with widely differing views of the
Court's proper role in the American system of government have lauded
the values of percolation in both constitutional and statutory cases.
35
Indeed, early in 1984 all members of the Court joined an opinion re-
jecting a rule that would have allowed nonmutual collateral estoppel
against the federal government on the ground that "[a]lowing only one
final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it receives
from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question
before [the Supreme] Court grants certiorari."'1
3 6
This analysis suggests that many cases on the Court's certiorari
docket, while neither frivolous nor fact-bound, do not warrant a deci-
sion by the Supreme Court and would probably (and justifiably) be
denied review even apart from caseload pressures. However, a large
and potentially important class of cases remains unaccounted for.
About one-third of all petitions do claim that the decision below con-
flicts with the ruling of another appellate court. 37 Although the great
majority of the claims are totally spurious (thus placing the cases in one
134. Two examples of this phenomenon were noted by Professor Clyde W. Summers in a
report prepared for the Hruska Commission.
"The successorship problem [in labor law] is an important and difficult one on which
the Court would no doubt ultimately be required to speak. But the series of cases [in the
early 1970's] suggest some of the dangers of the Court speaking too soon and not allowing
the Courts of Appeal to make their contribution. Little would have been lost and something
might have been gained, by the Court's staying its hand....
"A second series of cases dealt with the issue of whether it was an unfair labor practice
for a union to sue members or former members to collect fines imposed for working during a
strike ...
"Again, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly have been required ultimately to speak
on some aspects of this issue, but there was no need for the Court to hear and decide the first
cases which arose, even to clarify its own decisions. The Courts of Appeal might not only
have illuminated but also settled some of the issues, had they been allowed to perform their
function. One can scarcely escape the conclusion in these cases that if the Supreme Court
had not spoken so soon, it would not have had to speak so often." C. Summers, Report on
Labor Law Cases in the Federal Appellate System 48-49 (1974) (on file with the author and
at the National Archives).
135. See, e.g., Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 917-18 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.,
338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari);
Burger Interview, supra note 29, at 39. It is particularly important to note that in the Justices'
eyes the value of the process is not limited to constitutional cases: "This litigation exempli-
fies the wisdom of allowing difficult issues to mature through full consideration by the courts
of appeals. By eliminating the many subsidiary, but still troubling, arguments raised by
industry, these courts have vastly simplified our task, as well as having underscored the
reasonableness of the agency view." E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,
135 n.26 (1977). See also infra note 144.
136. United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 572 (1984).
137. This is a very rough estimate based on the preliminary findings of my own study,
the study conducted by Professor Floyd Feeney for the Hruska Commission, see HRusKA
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of the categories discussed earlier), 138 there are a fair number of peti-
tions in which it is necessary to analyze the allegedly discordant cases
very closely to determine if there is a genuine conflict.
Yet, upon reflection, I have concluded that that fact itself-the dif-
ficulty just alluded to-goes a long way toward answering the underly-
ing question of what kinds of cases the Supreme Court ought to be
hearing. I suggest that the more difficult it is to determine whether a
conflict exists in a given case, the less likely it is that a Supreme Court
decision will make a significant contribution to uniformity and cer-
tainty in the law-which is, after all, why we care about conflicts in the
first place. The reason is simple: the same kinds of factual distinctions
that cast doubt on the existence of an actual conflict will prevent the
decision (if the Court takes the case) from being a dispositive precedent
for a large class of future disputes.
It is true that the courts may ultimately decide that the distinctions
are immaterial; that is, they may retrospectively determine that the
conflict was genuine. But that requires more litigation. And in the
meantime, from the standpoint of planning and negotiation, the ques-
tions remain open and the uncertainty continues.
Of course, the effect of any precedent depends on the scope of the
holding, the breadth of the rationale, and the nature of the particular
factual variations that give rise to litigation. And a Supreme Court
decision may well include reasoning or even an explicit statement of
result that will provide guidance for the resolution of controversies that
differ in one or more arguably relevant respects from the case before
the Court. Yet, under basic doctrines of precedent, such statements can
be no more than dicta. They will be given respect, and they will cer-
tainly help the bar and the lower courts to predict the outcomes of the
variant cases. But lower courts can reach contrary results without vio-
lating the hierarchical principle, and the Supreme Court can do so
without violating the doctrine of stare decisis.139 To put it another way,
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 96, 67 F.R.D. at 305, and the study conducted by
Dean Casper and Judge Posner, see G. CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 87-89.
138. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 100-01, 67 F.R.D. at 309-10; G.
CASPER & R. POSNER, supra note 32, at 87-89. Again, my own research has not progressed
to the point where I can provide hard data.
139. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170,
186-88 (1981) (repudiating dictum relied upon by lower court); Barrett v. United States, 423
U.S. 212, 222-23 (1976) (agreeing with lower court that dictum in earlier case was not con-
trolling). For a more recent example, compare Weber Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 688
F.2d 638, 641-44 (9th Cir. 1982) ("linchpin" of 1979 Supreme Court opinion is that Exemp-
tion 5 of Freedom of Information Act "embraces only those civil discovery privileges explic-
itly recognized in the legislative history"), with United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 104 S.
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when a true conflict exists, a Supreme Court decision will authorita-
tively determine the correctness of the rulings on both sides of the com-
mon issue, while in the "sideswipe" situation 140 the resolution of cases
not before the Court must be less than definitive. And the more attenu-
ated the claim of conflict, the less likely it is that the decision will pro-
vide a controlling precedent in any substantial number of future
controversies. 141
This is not to deny that a strong dictum from the Supreme Court
can be almost as authoritative for lawyers and lower courts as a square
holding.142 The problem is that the sideswipe cases in which review is
denied are generally not likely to provide the occasion for strong dicta
that will settle the legal consequences of one or two discrete variants of
the facts actually presented. Rather, the cases typically involve legal
rules which, as articulated or as applied, require consideration of a va-
riety of factual circumstances. Two or more courts, addressing facts
that are different in some but not all respects, will have reached superfi-
cially inconsistent results. Perhaps there will also be differences in the
verbal formulation of the rule. But the asserted conflicts are spurious
Ct. 1488, 1493-94 (1984) (unanimously reversing court of appeals; stating that "linchpin"
proposition was only dictum and was not controlling). Compare also Donovan v. Red Star
Marine Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 774, 782 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[We respectfully decline to follow the
Supreme Court dicta [in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), interpreting a fed-
eral regulation] since upon plenary consideration, a different result is warranted."), with
Cerro Metal Products v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 978-79 (3d Cir. 1980) (although the Court's
interpretation of the regulation "may well be technically categorized as dictum," it was inte-
gral to the Court's constitutional holding; "we choose to follow it as a matter of sound judi-
cial policy").
140. The term "sideswipe" has come into use as a shorthand for situations where two
courts have articulated divergent approaches to a common legal problem but have not
reached (and would not necessarily reach) different results on identical facts. See HRUSKA
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 16, 67 F.R.D. at 221; supra note 88.
141. For example, in Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34 (1981), the Solicitor Gen-
eral argued in his certiorari petition that the decision below was "to some extent irreconcila-
ble with" decisions of three other circuits. Petition for Cert. at 7. The Supreme Court
reversed that decision, but in the following Term it also reversed one of the supposedly
conflicting judgments. See Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265 (1982). (The respondent in Gray
Panthers anticipated this possibility. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Cert. at
12-15.) Similarly, in Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1981), the
Ninth Circuit stated flatly that the precedent it relied upon was in conflict with a decision of
the Seventh Circuit. Yet when the Supreme Court granted review in both cases, it held that
both courts had erred. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
Significantly, in each instance the Supreme Court decision left considerable room for further
litigation. See Brown v. Smith, 662 F.2d 464, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1981) (effect of decision in
Gray Panthers); Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 385 (tax benefit rule "must be applied on a case-by-
case basis").
142. See, e.g., United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484-86 (9th Cir. 1983) (en
banc); but see id at 487 & n.3 (Skopil, J., dissenting).
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because the decisions can readily be reconciled through application of
the familiar techniques of case matching that are the essence of a com-
mon law system. 143 And the larger the number of arguably relevant
considerations, or the greater the variety of the underlying factual con-
texts, the less likely it is that one opinion-or six--could ever be
"definitive.""
It may be objected that the difference between a square conflict
and a sideswipe is merely one of degree. From the standpoint of
achieving uniformity and certainty in the law, the objection continues,
does it make sense to say that the appropriateness of Supreme Court
review depends on whether two or more appellate courts happen to
confront facts that are identical in all relevant respects rather than dif-
ferent in some arguably relevant particular?
143. Compare, e.g., Terrell v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 644 F.2d 1112, 1121-24
(5th Cir. 1981) (international unions insufficiently implicated in original charge filed with
EEOC to permit imposition of liability under Title VII), cert. denied on this issue, 456 U.S.
972 (1982), with Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657
F.2d 890, 904-08 (7th Cir. 1981) (Title VII suit allowed to proceed against Joint Apprentice-
ship Committee, even though it was not named in initial charge), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017
(1982). See also supra note 88.
144. The presence of arguably distinguishing factors also increases the likelihood that the
Court will benefit from further consideration of an issue in the lower courts before the Jus-
tices attempt a definitive answer. For example, in Foremost Ins. Co. v. Progress Marine,
Inc., 454 U.S. 860, denying cert. to 642 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1981), the Court denied certiorari
despite a claim of intercircuit conflict on the interpretation of a clause in a maritime insur-
ance contract that provided for reimbursement of wreck removal expenses when "such re-
moval is compulsory by law." The court below, a panel of the Fifth Circuit, had adopted a
broad construction of the clause, rejecting a decision of the Second Circuit limiting coverage
to situations where removal was specifically ordered by a governmental agency. But the
court had also suggested that the Second Circuit's pronouncement on the point was only
dictum, because in the earlier case the "compulsory removal" provision had not actually
come into play. See 642 F.2d at 819 & n.5.
Less than two years after the denial of review in Progress Marine, the Fifth Circuit
reconsidered the issue en banc. Although the court did not embrace the Second Circuit's
narrow position, it did adopt a more restrictive interpretation than the one applied by the
Progress Marine panel--a shift emphasized by the fact that the participating members of the
panel dissented from the en banc decision. See Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 706
F.2d 1365, 1378 (5th Cir. 1983). The effect was twofold. Not only did the en banc decision
ameliorate whatever conflict may have existed; it also provided an intermediate position for
the Supreme Court to consider when it finally addressed the question. As of March, 1984,
the Second Circuit had not had occasion to respond to the Fifth Circuit's analysis; indeed, a
Lexis search revealed no new cases from any court construing the "compulsory by law"
language.
These later developments confirm the wisdom of the Supreme Court's action in denying
certiorari in the face of a superficially plausible claim of intercircuit conflict. And because
the Justices are well aware of these possibilities, see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying
text, the Court would in all likelihood have denied review even if it had had more room on
its docket.
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I think it does. First of all, appellate decisions, even today, repre-
sent only a small fraction of the underlying disputes in a given area.
The fact that two or more cases, indistinguishable in relevant respects,
have been adjudicated by different appellate courts makes it likely that
the common issue will recur in other jurisdictions as well. Second, law-
yers understand that in a common law system the courts will draw dis-
tinctions among superficially similar cases. They take that into account
in any event in advising their clients. Their task is made much more
difficult when courts of equivalent status have handed down conflicting
decisions on identical facts.'45 Third, the appearance of justice suffers
when similarly situated persons in different parts of the country are
treated differently because two courts have articulated inconsistent in-
terpretations of the same federal law.
There is, however, another variable that must be taken into ac-
count before we can generalize about the probable lawmaking value of
a Supreme Court decision in the context of a "sideswipe": the extent to
which existing Supreme Court precedents provide guidance in the same
general area: of the law. Often the issue presented to the Court will be
but one variant of a broader problem, other aspects of which have been
considered in earlier decisions. In that situation, a Supreme Court rul-
ing is likely to provide relatively little guidance beyond its immediate
factual setting because the arguments and dicta found in the new opin-
ion will have to be weighed against the holdings and rationales of other
cases. And on any particular set of facts there will be considerable
room for dispute over whether the new precedent or some earlier deci-
sion provides the most appropriate analogy.146 The new ruling would
145. Cf. United States v. Rodgers, 104 S. Ct. 1942, 1949 (1984) (even if defendant could
establish reliance on a decision of his own circuit narrowly construing a federal criminal
statute, "the existence of conflicting cases from other courts of appeals made review ... by
[the Supreme] Court and decision against [the narrow construction]. . . reasonably foresee-
able"; thus retroactive application of the broader construction was not impermissible).
146. It is difficult to find examples involving sideswipes because the Supreme Court so
seldom grants review in sideswipe cases. However, the point is equally valid in the context
of actual conflicts. For instance, in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981), the Court granted review to resolve an intercircuit conflict on the standard of
proof borne by a defendant in a Title VII suit. The Court resolved the conflict and rejected
the view taken by the Fifth Circuit. Shortly afterwards, the Court directed the Fifth Circuit
to reconsider another Title VII case in light of Burdine. The Fifth Circuit did so, but by a
divided vote adhered to its original ruling. The court stated that Burdine affected only "dis-
parate treatment" cases, and that "disparate impact" suits were still governed "by clear and
recent Supreme Court precedent unaltered by Burdine." Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657
F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
The point is also illustrated by Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724
(10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981). The court of appeals relied on existing
precedents for its holding that federal law preempted state regulation of hunting and fishing
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be simply one more datum for the case-matching process that would be
undertaken in any event; 47 as such it would contribute only margin-
ally-if at all 48 -to uniformity and certainty in the law. 149
The position is quite different when there are no other Supreme
Court cases even remotely on point. In that situation, a single opinion
becomes the vade mecum for all future disputes in the particular area
of the law, and each argument or dictum is likely to be regarded as
binding authority.150 Thus, even in the absence of a square conflict, the
decision would probably have lawmaking value well beyond its specific
facts. How much guidance the ruling actually provides will depend,
among other things, on the extent to which its facts are typical of those
that give rise to other disputes.
15 1
My research has not yet progressed to the point where I can say
how many sideswipe cases involve issues that are being litigated with
sufficient frequency to warrant a decision at the national level, yet are
so novel that existing Supreme Court precedents furnish little or no
on an Indian reservation. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment for reconsideration in
light of an intervening decision holding that an Indian tribe could not, as a general matter,
regulate hunting and fishing on lands located within the reservation but not owned by the
tribe or its members. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). On remand, the
court of appeals adhered to its prior ruling in a brief opinion that relied on another interven-
ing Supreme Court case. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed in an opinion that re-
lied primarily on still other cases. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324
(1983), aj'g677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982).
147. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 49-52 (1930).
148. See infra text following note 164.
149. Cf Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 457 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I fear
that the sudden appearance of a new Supreme Court precedent in this area will unjustifiably
provoke new litigation and prolong old litigation. .. ").
150. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). For sev-
eral years this decision stood as the Court's only precedent defining the obligations imposed
on recipients of federal funds by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As such, it
was the starting point for analysis in just about every case involving section 504, even in
contexts very remote from the one that gave rise to Davs. See, e.g., Rhode Island Handi-
capped Action Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 718 F.2d 490 (Ist Cir. 1983).
Not until 1984 did the Court hand down another decision construing section 504. See Con-
solidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984); see also Smith v. Robinson, 104 S.
Ct. 3457, 3471-74 (1984) (discussing section 504 in context of claim for attorney's fees).
151. For example, in its first decision construing the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, the Court reversed a ruling in favor of the handicapped plaintiff. The
court below had described its holding as "narrow" and "limited to the unique facts of this
case." Rowley v. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist., 632 F.2d 945, 948
(2d Cir. 1980), rev'd 458 U.S. 176 (1982). Subsequent cases in the courts of appeals, includ-
ing one remanded for reconsideration in light of Rowley, have often distinguished Rowley
and upheld the claims of the handicapped child. See, e.g., Tatro v. Irving Indep. School
Dist., 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1983), af'din relevantpart, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984); Springdale
School Dist. No. 50 of Washington County v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1982) (after
remand), cer. denieg 461 U.S. 927 (1983).
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guidance to lawyers and lower courts. But even without that informa-
tion, the distinction between the conflict and the sideswipe remains rel-
evant in evaluating the practicality of the ad hoc reference system
contemplated by the Intercircuit Tribunal proposal. Sideswipes out-
number genuine conflicts, perhaps by a ratio of four or five to one.'
5 2
As is evident from the preceding discussion, identifying sideswipe is-
sues that should be resolved by a national court is far more difficult
than isolating actual conflicts. The task would be made even more
complex if the responsibility for deciding the cases on the merits were
to be divided between two courts. The very fact that there is no square
conflict means that it will be impossible, at least at the certiorari stage,
to articulate with any great precision the "issue" to be resolved.' 53 This
in turn would make it difficult to predict the probable ramifications of
the ultimate ruling-something the Supreme Court would surely want
to consider before making an ad hoc referral to another tribunal. On
the other hand, if the Court, to ease its own burdens, were to apply
generous standards of certworthiness to the sideswipes, fifty additional
places a year on the combined dockets would be quite inadequate to
accommodate all of the cases that would qualify.
The crux of the matter is that a Supreme Court decision is most
likely to make a significant contribution to uniformity in the law when
the issue it addresses is not only recurring and doubtful, but also dis-
crete-that is, when the decision can be expected to settle, with a mini-
mum of further legal analysis, the rights and liabilities of potential
litigants in the entire class of cases arising out of a recurring kind of
factual situation. Issues of that kind are the exception rather than the
rule in a common law system.'
54
152. This is an estimate based on early results from my own research. In Professor Fee-
ney's study for the Hruska Commission, "strong partial conflicts" and "weak partial con-
flicts" outnumbered "direct conflicts" by a ratio of less than two to one. See HRUSKA
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 101, 67 F.R.D. at 310. The difference between this
finding and my estimate may be traceable, in part, to different criteria for distinguishing
between direct conflicts and those that are more attenuated. See also G. CASPER & R. Pos-
NER, supra note 32, at 89-90 (finding smaller proportion of genuine conflicts than Professor
Feeney).
153. Compare, e.g., Castorr v. Brundage, 459 U.S. 928, 930-31 (1982) (White, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (arguing that Court should resolve conflict on question of
whether a plaintiff suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is precluded by res judicata from relitigat-
ing issues that he could have presented, but did not, in previous state litigation), with id at
928-30 (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (finding no conflict on
applicability of resjudicata in challenges to state decisions terminating parental rights; argu-
ing that resolution of res judicata issue depends on character of federal constitutional claim
and nature of earlier proceeding).
154. Thus it is somewhat ironic that United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973), has
so often been cited as exemplifying the kind of question that should be settled at the earliest
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This analysis does not imply that sideswipe cases (or, for that mat-
ter, cases of first impression) should necessarily be rejected by the
Court. As I have already suggested, other circumstances may well jus-
tify review even where no direct conflict can be identified.'55 What I
am saying is that the presence of a sideswipe-in contrast to a con-
flict-does not, of itself, ordinarily indicate that a case merits resolution
at the national level.
56
C. Uncertainty and Interstitial Lawmaking
Those who argue that an Intercircuit Tribunal is needed to bring
about uniformity and consistency in federal law bear the burden of
showing that the Supreme Court's limited capacity for decisionmaking
has resulted in disuniformity and inconsistency on a large scale. They
have not met that burden. But this failure of d proof is not necessarily
dispositive on the question of whether some sort of auxiliary court
should be created. As the preceding pages have demonstrated, the
Supreme Court can probably resolve all ripe intercircuit conflicts. It
can also address great issues like the constitutionality of the legislative
veto, 1:7 and it can intervene in other exigent situations such as disputes
between sovereigns or threats to important government programs.'
58
Over a period of years, it will probably be able to provide at least a
possible time without necessarily waiting for am intercircuit conflict. See, e.g., HRUSKA
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 23-24, 67 F.R.D. at 229. Perhaps that characteriza-
tion is correct, but the issue presented by that case-whether mutual fund shares in a dece-
dent's estate are to be valued, for federal tax purposes, at the "bid" or the "asked" price-is
of a kind that is relatively rare in the law: there are no shades of gray, but only black and
white; and once the issue is decided in one case, that ruling will immediately resolve, with-
out further inquiry, all disputes of a similar nature. Cf., e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
506-07 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, there
will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so. . . that it is unlikely that the
courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers
to [the Fourth Amendment] question. ... ); Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460
U.S. 370, 385 (1983) ("[IThe tax benefit rule must be applied on a case-by-cae basis");
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
536 (1983) (on issue of antitrust standing, "the infinite variety of claims that may arise make
[sic] it virtually impossible to announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every
case").
In several areas of the law that account for a large number of federal appellate cases, a
high proportion of the decisions turn on the sufficiency of the evidence or other determina-
tions that involve only the application of well-settled rules to particular facts. Among these
areas are social security, the Fourth Amendment, and review of NLRB orders.
155. See supra text accompanying note 103.
156. In any event, as will be developed more fully in part III, sideswipe cases will seldom
be appropriate candidates for ad hoc referrals to a new court.
157. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
158. See Helman, Discretionary Review, supra note 69, at 864.
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precedent or two in most of the broad, and some of the narrow, areas of
federal governance.'5 9 What the Court cannot do, except in a sporadic
way, is engage in interstitial lawmaking-the task of interpreting and
elaborating upon its landmark precedents.' 60 But the essence of a com-
mon law system is that "no case can have a meaning by itself,'1 61 and
that legal rules have meaning only as they are applied in a series of
cases. 162 From that standpoint, advocates of the new court would be
quite correct in arguing that ond Court of nine Justices can do at best
an incomplete job of declaring the law.
The difficulty is that the common law process need not take place
within a single court. The job of filling in the interstices of the
Supreme Court's landmark rulings will be carried on in the federal
courts of appeals and state appellate courts in any event. How much
difference does it make that the United States Supreme Court can make
only a limited contribution to the process?
Certainly it makes some difference. For one thing, when the Court
deals with a particular statute or doctrine only in occasional decisions
at long intervals, the Justices may not fully appreciate how the cases fit
into their broader legal or factual setting. Moreover, the cases that do
attract the Justices' attention may well be ones that involve extreme or
at best idiosyncratic facts or claims. And the smaller the number of
relevant Supreme Court decisions, the greater the weight that will at-
tach to each of them in the deliberations of lower courts and the prac-
ticing bar. 63 Thus, when the Court rarely takes up issues in a
particular area, there is a substantial risk that the law will be skewed in
a way that would be avoided if the authoritative decisionmaker regu-
larly adjudicated cases of that kind.'"
On the other hand, there is at least some evidence to suggest that a
larger number of nationally binding decisions in areas where the Court
is already active might also have undesirable consequences. Over the
159. See Hellman, supra note 59, at 630-33.
160. In any given period, there will probably be two or three areas of the law in which
the Court's intensive activity does amount to interstitial lawmaking on a fairly large scale.
Typically, these will be areas in which the Court has announced a new constitutional right
or has undertaken a clarification or rethinking of existing doctrines and rules. See Hellman,
supra note 2, at 1794-96. More commonly, the Court will issue one or two landmark deci-
sions, after which no further enlightenment will be forthcoming. See Hellman, supra note
59, at 630-32.
161. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 147, at 48.
162. See E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1948).
163. See Hellman, Discretionary Review, supra note 69, at 872 n.392; supra notes 150-51
and accompanying text.
164. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1796 n.305.
last decade, no area of the law has received more consistent or more
extensive attention from the Supreme Court than the Fourth Amend-
ment. In the last three Terms of the 1970's, the Court handed down
twenty-four plenary decisions on the law of search and seizure-more
than were devoted to any other specific constitutional guarantee, in-
cluding the free-speech clause of the First Amendment. 61 The three
Terms that followed brought nineteen more decisions primarily involv-
ing Fourth Amendment issues.' 66 Yet the law of search and seizure
remains one of the most confused and contradictory areas of constitu-
tional adjudication. Doctrines have proliferated to the point where the
legality of almost any warrantless search arguably will be controlled by
three, four, or even more lines of precedent. 167
Perhaps there is some pathology about the Fourth Amendment
that has created this unhealthy state of affairs. But the fact remains
that the one area in which there is no shortage of nationally binding
decisions is one in which there is tremendous confusion and uncer-
tainty. Until advocates of the new court can demonstrate why this phe-
nomenon is not representative, it would be foolish indeed to create new
structures that would expand the national decisional capacity and thus
permit the replication of the Fourth Amendment quagmire in other ar-
eas of the law.
168
It should also be remembered that the lack of a squarely control-
ling Supreme Court precedent is only one of the sources of uncertainty
and unpredictability in the law. For example, the legal consequences
of a particular transaction may depend on a well settled rule that gives
the trial court wide discretion to reach different or even inconsistent
results that will not be disturbed on appeal.169 Administrative agencies
not only have wide leeway in determining the "facts" upon which legal
165. See Hellman, supra note 59, at 533-38.
166. See Appendix, Table III.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 719 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1983) (directing district
court to consider whether discovery of drugs could be justified by "search incident to arrest,"
"automobile," or "good faith" exceptions to rule requiring warrants); Meyers v. State, 432
So.2d 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (search not justifiable as search incident to arrest, inven-
tory search, or vehicular search), rep'd, 104 S. Ct. 1852 (1984).
168. Recent work by Professor Easterbrook suggests that this is exactly what would hap-
pen if the Court had the time to hand down as many decisions in other areas of the law as it
does on Fourth Amendment questions. See Easterbrook, supra note 41, at 807, 831.
169. See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285-90 (1982); Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278,287-91 (1960). See also Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., 715 F.2d 142,
145 (4th Cir. 1983) ("While we would be required to affirm if the district judge had dis-
missed these cases, we are equally required to affirm his denial of the motions to dismiss
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obligations will be based;17 they may also modify or even reverse the
governing rules without running afoul of appellate courts' willingness
to defer to "expertise" or the lessons of experience. 7 1 Within a single
agency or appellate court, different panels may view a given transaction
quite differently while applying the same articulated rule of law.
72
Even when the Supreme Court addresses a recurring issue, its opinion
may be so ambiguous or fact-specific as to leave the question little more
settled than it was before. For example, although the present Court has
expressed a preference for "bright-line" rules on some issues, 73 it has
also handed down decisions under which the legal consequences of pri-
mary conduct will be determined by the "totality of the circum-
stances"'174 or "on a case-by-case basis."'
75
These sources of uncertainty are magnified by the operation of the
adversary system. In structuring a transaction or considering litigation,
a lawyer must make an informed guess about the probable responses of
the other parties and their lawyers. Those responses in turn will de-
pend on such variables as wealth, aversion to risk, transaction costs,
and familiarity with the law.
170. See, e.g., Herman Bros., Inc. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 1981).
171. See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 104 S. Ct. 1086, 1094 (1984); NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 265-67 (1975); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S.
747, 783-84 (1968); Certainteed Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 1042, 1054-55 (11th Cir. 1983);
Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (5th Cir. 1983); Melrose-Wakefield Hosp.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 563, 567 (1st Cir. 1980).
172. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 2, at 655.
173. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 841 n.18 (1983); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458-60 (1981).
174. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411,417 (1981); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). See also Rogers
v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-14 (1977) (reaffirming
"totality of the circumstances" approach established by Warren Court precedent).
175. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 381-85 (1983) (tax-
payers and Government proposed competing formulations of the tax benefit rule; Court
rejected both formulations and concluded instead that the rule "must be applied on a case-
by-case basis"). See also Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984) (holding
that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be judged by "an objective standard of
reasonableness"; emphasizing the undesirability of attempting to lay down any "particular
set of detailed rules"); Gilmore, Reflections on Statutory Null#Fcation: A View ofthe Long-
shoremens' and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1983)
("evasive and hesitant" opinion in Sindia Steam Nay. Co. v. de los Santos, 451 U.S. 156
(1981), fails to provide clear answer to question of shipowner's duty toward employees of
stevedore); Susman, Standing in Private Antitrust Cases: Where Is the Supreme Court GoingZ
52 ANTITRUST L.J. 465, 475 (1983) ("absence of a black letter rule" after Supreme Court
decision in Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519 (1983), see supra note 154, will provide "a fertile ground for litigation at the
beginning of any antitrust case").
Taking these and other considerations into account, Professor
Anthony D'Amato has recently argued that legal certainty actually de-
creases over time, and that "[r]ules and principles of law become more
and more uncertain in content and in application because legal systems
are biased in favor of unravelling those rules and principles."' 76 One
need not accept this extreme position to recognize that there are numer-
ous forces that produce uncertainty in the law, and that these forces
will continue to have a powerful effect even if the number of nationally
binding decisions is increased from 150 to 200 or even to 300.1 And
as long as it cannot be said that actual intercircuit conflicts are going
unresolved to any substantial extent, there is a real question whether a
larger number of interstitial decisions by a national tribunal would
contribute more than marginally to certainty and predictability in the
law. 7 ' At the least, Congress should wait for more evidence before
176. D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 1 (1983).
177. Chief Justice Burger envisaged a temporary panel that would decide about 50 cases
a year. A full-time, seven-judge National Court of Appeals could probably be expected to
hand down about 150 decisions annually.
178. Dean Paul Carrington has argued that "the Federal system is too big to be con-
trolled by the Supreme Court," and that as a result "the common law doctrine of precedent
cannot work very well in the Federal courts as presently organized." This in turn leads to
"instability and confusion in the law." Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979 Hearings
on S. 677 & S. 678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Judiciary Comn, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 93 (1979) (statement of Dean Carrington).
It would be difficult if not impossible to design and carry out a program of empirical
research that would confirm or refute these observations. However, as an a priori matter,
there is good reason to believe that Dean Carrington's view is unduly pessimistic. Long ago,
Karl Llewellyn noted that although the common law "is built up statewise," conflicting rules
emerge relatively rarely because of the institutions and techniques of adjudication that are
common to all states. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 147, at 50-51. Llewellyn was speaking of
48 separate judicial systems with different legal traditions, different methods of judicial se-
lection, and few channels of personal or institutional communication between judges from
different states. Within the federal system today there are a number of circumstances that
substantially strengthen the tendency toward uniformity, not only in the delineation of rules,
but also in their application. Federal judges are selected by a single method and share a
common loyalty to the national government. Their decisions are printed in the same
volumes of reports. Judges from different parts of the country are brought together at fre-
quent intervals by judicial conferences, Federal Judicial Center seminars, and intercourt
assignments. Above all, the federal judiciary remains, on a relative scale, quite small. Even
after the massive infusion ofjudgeships in 1978 and 1984, the total number of active federal
district judges has not yet reached 600. (By comparison, the state of California has 655
judges at the superior court level alone, with 600 more in municipal and justice courts. Tele-
phone interview (Mar. 23, 1984), supplementing JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1983
ANNUAL REPORT 97, 134.) (None of these figures include retired judges who continue to
perform some judicial services.) It is relevant, too, that even at the appellate level a large
proportion of the cases will be unanimous affirmances of decisions routinely applying estab-
lished rules to particular facts. See generally Aldisert, Appellate Justice, 11 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 317 (1978); Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United
States Courts fAppeals: The Price of Re/orm, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 621-22 (1981). If, in
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creating a new structure to issue those decisions.'
79
III. Uniformity and the Proposed Court
If the evidence showed that the Supreme Court's limited capacity
for definitive adjudication constituted a significant impediment to the
achievement of uniformity in federal law, the next question would be
whether the proposed Intercircuit Tribunal could be expected to solve
or mitigate the problem. There is good reason to believe that it would
not.
As initially drafted, the Senate bill contemplated a court of
twenty-six judges who would hear and decide cases in randomly com-
posed panels of seven.180 That is exactly the system that has led law-
these circumstances, the federal system is too big to be controlled by the Supreme Court, it is
hard to see how any large organization could function successfully. Cf. P. SToLZ, JUDGING
JUDGES 408-09 (1981) (noting California Supreme Court's difficulties in securing compli-
ance with its decisions by unsympathetic lower courts).
I do not ignore the fact that the Supreme Court is also responsible for overseeing the
adjudication of federal issues in state courts. But an occasional error by a state court that
results in the denial of a federal right does not mean that supervision is inadequate. To
paraphrase Professor Bator, "[a]ssuming that there 'exists,' in an ultimate sense, a 'correct'
[resolution of a federal claim], we can never be assured that any particular tribunal has in
the past made it: we can always continue to ask whether [a better decision could have been
reached]." See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prison-
ers, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441, 447 (1963). What federal supremacy requires is processes that
provide reasonable assurance that federal questions will be decided in accordance with the
rules laid down by the Supreme Court. Cf. id. at 448: "[T]he possibility of error [is] inherent
in any process. The task of assuring legality is to define and create a set of arrangements
and procedures which provide a reasoned and acceptable probability that justice win be
done, that the facts found will be 'true' and the law applied 'correct."'
179. Much has been made of the fact that in the 1981 Term, for the first time in recent
history, the Court granted review in more cases than it could hear in a single Term. See,
e.g., White, supra note 15, at 278. However, even putting aside the question whether all of
the cases truly deserved consideration at the national level, the significance of this develop-
ment should not be overstated. In the preceding Term, the Court had granted review in so
few cases that it was unable to fill its argument calendar for the April session. (The figures
for the 1977 through 1979 Terms were also below the level of the 1971-1976 period. See
Helman, supra note 59, at 526-27.) The Justices may well have responded by moving too
far toward the other extreme. In the 1982 Term the Court cut back substantially on the
number of cases granted review, and in 1983 the figure decreased even further. See 53
U.S.L.W. 3028 (1984); White Letter, supra note 10, at 2 ("[T]his term [1983] our certiorari
docket. . . contains a lower number of cases deserving further review than is normally the
case. . . ."). In any event, it would be shortsighted to place great reliance on year-to-year
fluctuations in the number of cases heard rather than trying to assess the needs of the na-
tional law.
180. See 129 CONG. REc. S1955 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Dole). The bill
proposed that two judges be selected from each of the 13 circuits, for a total of 26. The
initial House bill envisioned a similar system. (The number "twenty-eight" in § 61 of the
House bill presumably was a typographical error.).
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yers to complain of inconsistency and unpredictability in the decisions
of the large circuits.1 81 Nor is that surprising. A court that sits in small
panels selected by lot from among a much larger number of judges can
hardly develop any kind of institutional approach or recognized set of
policies. The lack of continuity in the Intercircuit Tribunal as it was
first proposed would thus make it difficult if not impossible to achieve
the predictability and stability that the Tribunal is designed to
create. 182
Recognizing the force of these arguments, the Subcommittee on
Courts modified the Senate bill to provide for a court composed of only
nine judges who would always sit en banc." 3 That is certainly an im-
provement over the initial version of the legislation, but it leaves un-
touched the more fundamental flaw in the proposed structure: its
reliance on a system of ad hoc case referrals prompted by the need to
resolve or perhaps forestall an intercircuit conflict. That approach as-
sumes that cases presenting actual or incipient conflicts typically in-
volve self-contained issues that can be shunted off for resolution by a
separate court with little or no effect on the development of the law
generally.
But federal law is not a body of distinct rules that operate in isola-
tion from one another. Even a narrow, relatively technical question of
statutory construction may depend on the application of doctrines such
as the "plain meaning" rule, the weight to be given to an agency's inter-
pretation of the statute it administers, or the significance to be accorded
the views of a Congress subsequent to the one that enacted the law. By
the same token, lower courts confronted with almost any kind of statu-
tory question may look to the entire corpus of Supreme Court opinions
for guidance on these matters.1 84 At a simpler level, unclear or ambig-
181. See Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 1188, 1208-09 (1974) (citing lawyers' statements); 1982 National Court
Hearings, supra note 2, at 4-5 (remarks of Dean Griswold); id. at 15 (remarks of Professor
Meador).
182. For these same reasons, it would be inadvisable to authorize the Supreme Court "to
refer conflict resolution cases to an existing court of appeals for an en banc decision on a.
random or rotating basis, with a provision that such decisions have nationwide precedential
effect unless modified by [the Supreme] Court." Stevens Letter, supra note 9, citing Wallace,
supra note 90, at 935. (Justice Stevens was describing the Wallace proposal; he did not
endorse it.) Indeed, all of the arguments in part III of this Article would apply with even
greater force to the idea of delegating part of the Supreme Court's conflict resolution func-
tion to the 13 courts of appeals on an ad hoc basis.
183. The House bill was amended in similar fashion by the Subcommittee on Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice.
184. See, e.g., Mid-Louisiana Gas Co. v. FERC, 664 F.2d 530, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1981) (in
assessing degree of deference due to agency order under Natural Gas Policy Act, court cited
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uous language in one clause or section often must be interpreted in the
light of other provisions of the legislation or with a gloss furnished by
the language or law of related statutory schemes. 185 In either situation,
the result is to broaden the range of precedents that must be taken into
account when any of the various issues are litigated.
If a new tribunal were to issue nationally binding decisions in a
selection of cases having nothing in common except the fortuity of an
intercircuit conflict, lawyers and lower courts would be required to har-
monize dual lines of authority in a way that might create more uncer-
tainty rather than less. For example, when a lawyer in the Ninth
Circuit today researches a point of securities law, he will find a small
body of Supreme Court decisions from which he will derive some
broad, general rules, together with a larger body of circuit precedents
that .apply those rules to particular facts or address relatively narrow
issues not covered by Supreme Court decisions. Yet unless the issue is
a simple one, the lawyer will not expect to find a square holding on the
precise point in question. Life is too varied to accommodate itself to a
necessarily finite number of precedents. Thus the lawyer will have no
choice but to consider dicta, alternate rationales, implications, and
holdings on related statutes. That process is difficult enough when it
involves cross-referencing the decisions of two courts. What would it
be like with a third court?
186
cases involving, inter alia, securities regulation, welfare, and truth in lending), vacated, 463
U.S. 319 (1983); Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 655 F.2d 951,
957 (9th Cir. 1981) (in construing Alaska Lands Act, court relied on Supreme Court decision
interpreting Freedom of Information Act), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982); Leist v. Simplot,
638 F.2d 283, 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1980) (majority and dissent differed on implications to be
drawn from Supreme Court decision interpreting different statute), aft'd, 456 U.S. 353
(1982).
185, See, e.g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981) (noting
"established practice of citing interchangeably decisions interpreting the pertinent sections
of the [Federal Power Act and the Natural Gas Act]"). See also Exxon Pipeline Co. v.
United States, 725 F.2d 1467, 1470 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Federal Power Act and Interstate
Commerce Act); United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.2d 1174, 1187-88 (6th Cir.
1982) (Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act), ar"don other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 575 (1984). Cf.
Zamora-Garcia v. United States Dep't of Justice, 737 F.2d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 1984)
("Although the Supreme Court's ruling only specifically has an impact upon the 'continuous
physical presence' requirement [in the statute permitting suspension of deportation], we-
without so deciding-have doubts that the Court would approach the 'extreme hardship'
requirement any differently.").
186. The kind of inquiry described in the text must, of course, be undertaken by lower
courts as well as lawyers. Indeed, the process can be seen in its starkest form when a court of
appeals considers whether, and to what extent, a circuit precedent (or line of precedents) has
survived a recent Supreme Court decision involving a related but not identical issue. Com-
pare Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[Blecause it is dictum, the
cited statement of the Supreme Court in Addonizio [v. United States, 442 U.S. 178 (1979)]
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What makes the arrangement so problematic is that the lawyer
would never know which cases-or issues-would ultimately be re-
did not overrule Third Circuit precedent granting the district court a 'reasonable time' past
• ..120 days" in which to reduce a criminal sentence), with United States v. Kajevic, 711
F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1983) (arguing that "the reference [in Addonizio] to the 120-day
limitation. . . was not a casual observation but an organic part of the Court's reasoning";
deciding case on other grounds), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 721 (1984); compare Uviedo v.
Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1432 n.12 (5th Cir. 1984) (opinion of Garwood, J.,
announcing the judgment of the court) (Supreme Court decision "did not change the rule
applied in this circuit for determining who has prevailed in a civil rights action"), with id at
1433 (Williams, J., joined by Thornberry, J., concurring specially) (circuit requirement that
plaintiff succeed on the "central issue" "is not made necessary by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. . ., and indeed may well be contrary to the import of that case"); compare United
States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984) (recent Supreme Court decision "so
changed the rules relating to unauthorized communications with jurors that the presumptive
prejudice standard as applied in [two circuit decisions] no longer governs"), with id at 539
(Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (the Supreme Court decision "involves a different line of cases
than those which address a presumption of prejudice"; circuit precedents are still valid and
require reversal); compare SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 899 (2d Cir.) (circuit precedent de-
cided prior to landmark Supreme Court decision on commercial speech "still states good
law") cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984), with id at 904 (Brieant, J., dissenting) (circuit prece-
dent "is now as dead as Marley, and if not dead, readily distinguished"); compare Robbins v.
Prosser's Moving & Storage Co., 700 F.2d 433 (8th Cir.) (en banc court, relying in part on
recent Supreme Court decisions that concededly "arose in different contexts [and did not]
focus on the precise question presented here," id at 441, overruled three prior decisions),
a17'd, 104 S. Ct. 1844 (1984), with id at 444 (Henley, J., dissenting) (two dissenting judges
found "nothing in the cited decisions . . . that persuade[d them] to abandon" the policy
applied in circuit precedents); compare NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 289 (4th
Cir. 1982) (en banc) ("In light of the unmistakable language in [a 1971 Supreme Court
decision] that 'the presence of an ensuing benefit. ..is not controlling' [for the purpose of
determining deductibility under I.R.C. § 162 (1982)], we conclude that such parts of [four
circuit decisions] as may be interpreted as establishing a one-year standard for distinguish-
ing between capital and current costs, are no longer authoritative."), with id at 294
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) ("I find altogether unpersuasive the determination that an estab-
lished line of four circuit decisions must be rejected on the basis of a non-specific obiter
statement in [the Supreme Court decision]."); compare Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 320 (3d
Cir.) (reaffarming, in light of two recent Supreme Court decisions, a longstanding circuit rule
that public defenders are absolutely immune from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982), with Glover v. Tower, 700 F.2d 556, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that, in light of the same two Supreme Court decisions, circuit rule of absolute
imnunity for public defenders is no longer good law), af'd, 104 S. Ct. 2820 (1984). See also
Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 96, 103 (3d Cir. 1984) (1982 trilogy of
Supreme Court decisions on the "state action" requirement of Fourteenth Amendment did
not overrule a Third Circuit case holding that the University of Pittsburgh is a "state actor"
for purposes of section 1983), rev'g 563 F. Supp. 788 (W. D. Pa. 1983) (in light of the
Supreme Court decisions, "the standards employed in the [circuit precedent]. . . are not the
present controlling law"); United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 694-96 (5th Cir. 1984)
(expressing doubt that a line of circuit precedents "remains viable after" an intervening
Supreme Court decision, but deciding case on other grounds); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266
(3d Cir. 1983) (en banc) (court issued four separate opinions offering different analyses of
effect of Supreme Court decision on Third Circuit precedents delineating rights of involun-
tarily committed mental patients); Myers v. Washington, 702 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1983) (court,
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solved by the Supreme Court, and which by the Intercircuit Tribunal.
That would depend on the fortuity of a conflict and the Supreme
Court's decision of the moment on whether to refer the case or keep it
for itself. And the more the new court begins to address issues that do
not depend on the interpretation of particular statutory language, the
greater the likelihood that its decisions will have arguable relevance for
superficially unrelated kinds of litigation. " 7 On the other hand, if the
over dissent, adhered to previous decision notwithstanding Supreme Court's reversal of pre-
cedent relied on in initial ruling); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 695 F.2d 890, 893
(5th Cir. 1983). Cf. Weber Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 688 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding, over dissent, that recent Supreme Court decision vitiated precedents of two other
circuits holding material exempt from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 1488 (1984); Zamora-Garcia v. United States Dep't of Justice, 737 F.2d 488, 493
(5th Cir. 1984) (on petition for rehearing) (rejecting argument that precedents of other cir-
cuits no longer have precedential vitality after Supreme Court decision on scope of review of
Board of Immigration Appeals decisions, but agreeing with Immigration and Naturalization
Service that Fifth Circuit's "earlier liberal interpretation" of statute permitting suspension of
deportation "is precluded by" another Supreme Court decision construing a different phrase
in the same statute).
State courts, too, must assess the impact of Supreme Court decisions on their prior
rulings when federal rights are implicated. See, e.g., In re Patrick W., 104 Cal. App. 3d 615,
163 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981); In re Alessi, 60 N.Y.2d 229, 457
N.E.2d 682, 469 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1983) (judges divided 4-3 on effect of Supreme Court deci-
sions on previous ruling limiting attorney advertising), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984).
See also United States v. Diogenes, 638 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981); West Am. Ins. Co. v.
Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 1983) (both discussed in Hellman, Second Thought,
supra note 69, at 21-23).
187. Compare, e.g., Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 447 U.S. 191 (1980) (resolving conflict
in interpretation of Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act; decision has been
cited almost exclusively in cases involving veterans' reemployment rights), with Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519
(1978) (reaffirming and applying precedents on scope of review of agency action; decision
cited in wide variety of administrative law cases).
Even a decision that appears to rest on the interpretation of particular statutory lan-
guage may turn out to have implications for other kinds of litigation. For example, in
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), the Court resolved an intercircuit conflict "on
the standards the Internal Revenue Service must meet to obtain judicial enforcement of its
orders." Id at 50-51. The opinion relied primarily on the language and legislative history
of the relevant provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Two decades later, disagreement
over the implications of Powell provided an important element in the difference of opinion
between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court over the subpoena powers of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, an agency operating under an entirely different statute. See
Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. SEC, 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2720 (1984).
Similarly, the opinion in Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977), was devoted almost en-
tirely to an analysis of the language and legislative history of the Voting Rights Act of 1965;
yet the Supreme Court found that decision to be the most illuminating precedent in a case
arising under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937. See Block v. Community
Nutrition Inst., 104 S. Ct. 2450, 2456-58 (1984). Significantly, Morris was not even men-
tioned in the lower court's opinion in Block. See Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698
F.2d 1239, 1252 n.75 (1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2450 (1984).
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new court's docket were to be confined to square conflicts on narrow
issues, the available evidence suggests that there would be very little for
the Tribunal to do.
188
Is there any escape from this dilemma? One possible approach
would be to have categorical rather than ad hoc referrals. That is, in-
stead of asking the new court to decide a collection of unrelated cases
involving actual or potential conflicts, the Supreme Court would an-
nounce in advance, preferably through some kind of rulemaking pro-
cess, that the new court would be given primary responsibility for
overseeing the development of the law in particular areas of federal
regulation. Thereafter, all cases in those areas would be referred unless
the Justices found good reason not to do so. The Intercircuit Tribunal
would grant or deny review in accordance with what it perceived the
needs of the national law to be.
This arrangement would permit a substantial amount of interstitial
lawmaking to be carried on at the national level in those areas of the
law that the Supreme Court chose to commit to the new tribunal. And
while the Supreme Court would be empowered to review the Tribu-
nal's decisions by writ of certiorari, the assumption must be that review
would almost never be granted; otherwise the whole system would be
pointless. Thus the new court would provide all of the precedential
guidance that otherwise would have to come from the Supreme Court,
but in limited areas of the law.
What I have described is, in essence, the approach proposed sev-
eral years ago by Dean Paul Carrington and other members of the Ad-
visory Council for Appellate Justice. 189 On the surface, at least, it
would involve a more radical restructuring than the bills now under
consideration. But it would be more consistent with the traditions of
the common-law lawmaking process; would minimize (though not
avoid entirely) the development of inconsistent lines of authority appli-
cable to the same cases; and would permit the performance of a task
that clearly cannot be performed by the Supreme Court alone.
Whether this kind of reform is necessary is another question; for the
reasons given in the preceding section, I am not yet convinced that it
is. 19
0
188. See supra text accompanying notes 91-121.
189. See P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 215-16
(1976); Hufstedler, Courtship and Other LegalArts, 60 A.B.A. J. 545, 547-48 (1974).
190. Additional supervision by a court of national jurisdiction may well prove necessary
at some time in the future. If so, however, this will come about not from caseload growth
alone but rather as a consequence of the proliferation of decisionmakers in the lower federal
courts. One of the ironies of the present debate is that so much of the opposition to the
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IV. Risks for the Supreme Court
In giving qualified support to Chief Justice Burger's proposal for a
tribunal very much like the one contemplated by the pending legisla-
tion, Professor Daniel Meador suggested that creation of the new court
"would involve little expense [and] carry virtually no risk of harm to
the system or to anyone's interest."' 9 ' I fear that this view is unduly
optimistic.
In saying this, I do not refer to fiscal costs or to the possible effect
on the morale of court of appeals judges who are not chosen for the
new tribunal. Although these considerations appear to loom large in
the minds of those who urge only a temporary court composed of cir-
cuit judges sitting by designation, they should be given little weight.9 z
What concerns me, rather, is the effect of creating the Intercircuit
Tribunal on the Supreme Court's performance of the responsibilities it
would not delegate. In particular, I foresee two undesirable conse-
quences. First, the case selection process would become more complex
and perhaps more divisive. Second, the Supreme Court would tend to
become, even more than it is today, a court of constitutional adjudica-
tion-a result that would pose risks both for the decisional process
within the Court and for public acceptance of the Court's role.
A. New Complications in the Case Selection Process
The current legislation contemplates that the Supreme Court
would select the docket of the new court. For reasons I have set forth
elsewhere, that is the only acceptable approach. 193 But there is no
proposed Intercircuit Tribunal rests on the undesirability of adding a "fourth tier" to the
federal judicial system. See, e.g., Horowitz & Poster, The Proposed Panel to Resolve Intereir-
cult Conflids: A Brief View From the Litigant's Perspective, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371
(1984); Frank Statement, supra note 93, at 9. That battle has already been lost. As a result
of the vast-and relatively unheralded--expansion in the roles of magistrates and bank-
ruptcy judges over the last decade, a substantial number of cases undergo three tiers of
adjudication without ever reaching a court of national jurisdiction. For those cases, a new
national court would be not a fourth but a fifth tier. Full discussion is beyond the scope of
this Article, but I cannot resist suggesting that if the federal judicial system is to avoid the
specter of "bureaucratic justice," see McCree, Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 777 (1981), Congress must face the hard questions of what the federal courts
ought to be doing, rather than continuing to create new armies of federal decisionmakers,
with or without Article III status.
191. Meador, A Comment on the Chief Justice's Proposals, 69 A.B.A. J. 448, 449 (1983).
192. See infra part V.
193. Hellman, How Not to Help the Supreme Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 750 (1983). In essence,
the objection to other methods is that, to one degree or another, they would deprive the
Supreme Court of the power to decide when, in what case, and by whom, a recurring issue
will be resolved. Justices at both ends of the political spectrum have emphasized the impor-
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blinking the fact that it would entail additional work for the Justices.
Admittedly, when seven members of the present Court gave their
views on the Hruska Commission's proposal for a National Court of
Appeals with reference jurisdiction, none of them-even those who op-
posed the idea-appeared troubled by the prospect of having to select
the new court's docket.1 94 But I cannot help wondering whether they
fully thought through the implications of this arrangement. 95
Today, the Justices have only three ways of handling the cases
brought to them for review: they can grant plenary consideration; they
can decide the case summarily; or they can deny review altogether.1
96
Reference jurisdiction would add a fourth option: reference to the new
court. 19 7 It does not take an expert in small-group theory to predict
that expanding the number of choices available to a nine-person com-
mittee in a large number of decisions would substantially increase the
potential for dissension and even deadlock. In particular, the Justices
are unlikely to share the same view of the appropriate role of the In-
tercircuit Tribunal in the development of federal law; and even if they
do, they will probably differ in the weight that they give to "percola-
tion," both generally and in particular cases.'98
tance of this "gatekeeping" function. See Brennan, supra note 28, at 484-85; infra note 201
(views of Chief Justice Burger). See also Swygert, supra note 2, at 338-39.
194. For example, Justice Brennan "stated that. . . he was unable presently to perceive
any reasons indicating that [the] proposed reference jurisdiction would be unworkable
... ." HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, spra note 2, at 180, 67 F.R.D. at 400 (paraphrasing
views of Justice Brennan).
195. Another possible explanation is that the Justices found the reference procedure un-
objectionable because they assumed that the only cases that would even be considered for
referral would be cases involving purely "technical" questions of statutory construction that
happened to have given rise to intercircuit conflicts. On that premise, the prospect of having
to select the new court's docket might not arouse great concern. But it is far from clear that
any substantial proportion of the conflict cases that come to the Court involve issues that are
truly "technical" in the sense that they implicate no broad policy considerations and call for
no choices between competing values. See infra note 209. More important, to the extent
that such cases do exist, they contribute significantly to the Court's performance of its role in
the American system of government. See infra part IV Section B.
196. When cases first come before them, the Justices actually have a fourth option: hold-
ing the petition pending the disposition of a case scheduled for plenary consideration. See
Hellman, Second Thoughts, supra note 69, at 38 n.127. Once the plenary decision is handed
down, the Justices again have the three choices listed in the text.
197. In fact, the pending legislation would actually add two new options: referring the
case with directions to decide it, or referring the case and giving the new court discretion
whether to decide it. SeeS. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 604, 129 CONG. Rsc. S1947, S1956
(daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983).
198. Compare, e.g., McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct. 2438, 2438-39 (1983) (opinion of
Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun and Powell, JJ., concurring in denial of certiorari), with
Gilliard v. Mississippi, 104 S. Ct. 40, 41-44 (1983) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); compare Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940, 941
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No doubt the Court could devise procedures or standards that
would enable it to handle potentially divisive situations, but it is hard
to avoid the conclusion that the availability of an ad hoc reference op-
tion would complicate the -selection process and thus add to the Jus-
tices' burdens.9 9 A categorical reference system would probably
operate more smoothly; to what extent would depend on the nature of
the categories used.2°°
B. Risks of Delegating Statutory Issues to the New Court
The most serious cost of creating an Intercircuit Tribunal lies in its
effect on the Supreme Court's decisional work. To gauge that effect, it
is necessary to make some fairly specific predictions about how the
Court would use the reference option. Proponents of the Tribunal con-
template that the Court would refer cases involving intercircuit con-
fliets.20 1 Let us accept that premise and look at the Term that ended in
(1978) (Blackmun, J., joined by Marshall and Powell, JJ., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) ("I cannot regard the issue as . . .too fact-specific or incapable of precedential ef-
fect."), with id. at 945 (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) ("the
absence of any conflict among the Circuits is plainly a sufficient reason for denying
certiorari").
199. Some of the potential complications could be avoided if cases could be referred to
the new tribunal only on the affirmative vote of six Justices, rather than the five contem-
plated by the current Senate bill. See also infra note 261.
200. The system of reference jurisdiction contemplated by the proposed legislation might
add to the Supreme Court's burdens in two other ways. First, it has been argued that in-
creased decisional capacity would itself spur additional filings by litigants who would other-
wise have refrained from seeking review because the chances of success seemed so small.
See, e.g., The Intercircuit Tribunal: Statement by the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York 5 (undated; submitted to the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., Nov. 10, 1983); National Court of Appeals Act. Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976) (remarks of Judge Lay) [hereinafter cited as 1976
National Court Hearings]; Stevens, Judicial Restraint, supra note 16, at 179-80. I do not find
this argument persuasive; considering the volume of hopeless petitions filed today, it is hard
to believe that lawyers hold back in a substantial number of cases that would be certworthy
under somewhat more generous standards. See supra note 108.
A more plausible argument is that the Supreme Court would have to give careful scru-
tiny to all of the new court's decisions and would be obliged to consider the merits of any
that it thought wrong. See 1976 National Court Hearings, supra, at 244 (statement of Judge
Friendly). And it is no answer to say that the issues referred would be "technicar' or "rou-
tine." See infra note 209.
201. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger stated that the new court would "decide allintercircuit
conflicts." Burger, supra note 6, at 447 (emphasis added); see also Burger, supra note 101, at
37 ("In each of the past three terms of Court, we heard an average of 42 cases involving
conflicts. These are the cases we would refer to the national en bane panel."). Nevertheless,
I assume that the Chief Justice did not mean literally "all." For one thing, jurisdictional
lines should be drawn with the utmost clarity, both to minimize litigation and to avoid
doubts about the legitimacy of decisions. It would flout this principle to require the Court to
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July 1983. In that Term the Supreme Court resolved intercircuit con-
flicts on these issues, among others:
- May a state constitutionally require an independent candi-
date for President to meet an early filing deadline?2" 2
- Do witnesses in judicial proceedings have absolute immu-
nity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983?203
- Does it violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment for a state to allow parents an income tax de-
duction for the expenses of sending their children to paro-
chial schools?2' 4
- To obtain relief under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, must a plaintiff show discriminatory intent, or is it suf-
ficient to show disparate impact?
20 5
It does not require much argument to demonstrate that the
Supreme Court would never refer cases such as these--cases involving
issues of civil rights or other questions of constitutional law--to any
auxiliary court. Almost inevitably, decisions in these cases implicate
large questions of social policy or turn on deep-seated premises about
the competing claims of liberty and authority. The issues are too sensi-
tive, and the judgments too value-laden, for the Justices to let someone
else decide them. Nor would we want anyone else to decide them.20 6
Moreover, it is on constitutional issues that differences in lan-
guage, approach, or emphasis are most likely to convey conflicting
messages to litigants and lower courts. For example, Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is confusing enough today with only one Court
refer cases on the basis of something as elusive and subjective as the existence of an intercir-
cuit conflict. See Hellman, Discretionary Review, supra note 69, at 868 n.374; supra note 88.
More important, there will be some conflict cases that the Justices will not want to refer,
either because the issue is not ripe for resolution or because they wish to decide it them-
selves. The Chief Justice himself has emphasized that "fo]ne of the most important things
the Supreme Court does is to decide what not to do ... " Burger Interview, supra note 29,
at 39.
202. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
203. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
204. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
205. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
206. A corollary of this analysis is that the Court is unlikely to refer cases coming from
state courts even if Congress permits it to do so. In the four Terms 1980 through 1983 the
Court gave plenary consideration to 130 state court cases; all but one involved issues of civil
rights or federalism. The single exception was Tuten v. United States, 460 U.S. 660 (1983), a
case from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982) (for
purposes of Supreme Court review, "highest court of a State" includes District of Columbia
Court of Appeals).
Under the current House version of the Intercircuit Tribunal legislation, a case like
Tuten could not be referred to the new court. See supra note 11. There is some irony in this
fact, since Tuten is a paradigm of the kind of case the Court would probably want to refer.
See supra note 106.
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handing down nationally binding decisions;" 7 to have a separate tribu-
nal participate in the process would invite even greater disarray.20 8
The upshot is that the Court is likely to refer only petitions raising
narrow or technical questions of statutory construction.2 9 A few such
207. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
208. To some extent, the current disarray results from differences in the attitudes and
assumptions of the individual Justices who write for the Court. But most of the opinions do
have the support of at least a majority, and all are read and reviewed by every Justice before
they are issued. If two courts were to issue nationally binding opinions, that kind of scrutiny
would no longer be possible.
By the same token, not only disarray but chaos would likely result if the Intercircuit
Tribunal (or any other auxiliary court) were given direct jurisdiction to review state court
judgments resting on federal law, as some have suggested. See, e.g., 1981 National Court
Hearings, supra note 72, at 100-08 (statement of Justice Cameron). Under a system of refer-
ence jurisdiction, the Supreme Court at least has the ability to limit the issues the new court
would address. If direct appeals were permitted, the only safeguard against inconsistency
would be Supreme Court review of the new court's decisions-an additional burden that
would defeat one of the purposes of the enterprise. Allowing direct appeals from state
courts to a court of national jurisdiction would be undesirable for a second reason as well: it
would deprive the Supreme Court of its power to decide when, and in what case, to resolve a
recurring constitutional issue. See Swygert, supra note 2, at 338-39.
209. The discussion in the text proceeds on the premise that there exist at least some
statutory questions that are important enough to warrant resolution by a court of national
authority, yet narrow and technical enough that the Justices will be largely indifferent to
what that resolution is. See Frank Statement, supra note 93, at 8 (of 20 conflict cases on the
plenary docket in the 1979 Term, all but two were lacking in "inherent importance" and
would probably not have been granted review but for the conffict; thus the cases would be
prime candidates for referral to a new national court). It is not at all clear, however, that this
premise is correct. If an issue requires consideration at the national level, the reason must be
that it is both doubtful and recurring. A recurring issue is one whose resolution will affect
an entire class of litigants. The classes typically affected by the Supreme Court's statutory
decisions include such groups as harbor workers, union members, debtors, taxpayers, and
criminal defendants. These are classes whose claims-claims that by hypothesis are at least
arguable-are likely to trigger the deep-seated responses of sympathy or skepticism that
Holmes referred to as his "can't helps." See P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 76 (1968).
In these circumstances there is a real question whether the Justices would be content to refer
the cases to another tribunal for a nationally binding decision. It is even more questionable
whether the Justices would accept the new tribunal's decisions without very careful scrutiny.
These doubts are reinforced by examination of the three cases cited by Justice Stevens
as possible candidates for referral to a new court. See supra note 107. In one case, the
circuits divided over whether to give a federal criminal statute a literal interpretation and
thus exclude coverage of conduct that appeared to fall within the "mischief' Congress
sought to suppress. See United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 126 (1983). In another case, the question was whether an ambiguous statute created a
federal cause of action. See Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Sec. Fund v. Conti-
nental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 148 (1983). It cannot
be assumed that the Justices would regard issues of this kind as routine, or that the Justices
would be willing to let another court's decision stand whichever way it came out. See, e.g.,
Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982) (5-4 division on scope of federal criminal
statute); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982) (5-4 division
on existence of federal cause of action). Only the third case-involving the question
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referrals would do no harm, but the temptation would be great to refer
all or most cases of this kind.210 Certainly there is nothing in the legis-
lative history thus far to suggest that Congress would prefer that the
Court not do so. The effect would be to restrict the Court's work
largely to great issues of civil rights law, federalism, and the interpreta-
tion of statutes such as section 1 of the Sherman Act21I or section 8 of
the National Labor Relations Act,212 which have almost the breadth of
a constitutional provision. Indeed, it is quite possible that with a new
tribunal to resolve some of the narrow statutory issues that today must
be heard by the Supreme Court, the Justices would take a larger
number of constitutional cases for the purpose of correcting apparent
error.
2 13
For some commentators, a de facto division of the Court's work
into constitutional and nonconstitutional issues, with the latter diverted
to a new tribunal, would be a welcome solution to the caseload prob-
lem.214 Others will see it as but another step in a process that is already
far advanced; in recent Terms, only one-third of the Court's plenary
decisions have involved pure issues of statutory construction, divorced
from constitutional concerns.215 In my view, however, to move further
whether, under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), an unreasonable deviation
from the contract of carriage will deprive the carrier of its statutory limitation of liability-
appears to raise a question with few if any implications for broader policy debates. See
General Elec. Co. Int'l Sales Div. v. S.S. Nancy Lykes, 706 F.2d 80, 86-88 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 157 (1983). If so, however, the "technical" nature of the issue may be all
the more reason for the Supreme Court to keep the case for itself. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 213-21.
Notwithstanding these doubts, I proceed on the premise stated at the outset of this
footnote for the obvious reason that if there are no routine cases requiring resolution at the
national level, there would be no point at all in establishing a new court with reference
jurisdiction.
210. If the Court were to follow the approach suggested by the Chief Justice-reducing
its own plenary docket to about 100 cases a Term---this would almost certainly happen. See
infra note 234.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
213. See infra section C.
214. See, e.g., Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time for a
Change, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 628 (1974).
215. The tables in the Appendix are instructive on this point. In the first three Terms of
the 1980's, the Court handed down a total of 436 plenary decisions. See Table I. In 193 of
these, the principal issue decided, addressed, or presented was an issue of civil rights. Most
of the civil rights cases directly involved constitutional interpretation; the rest dealt with
modes of enforcing constitutional rights. See Table II; see also Hellman, The Supreme Court
and Civil Rights. The Plenary Docket in the 1970", 58 OR. L. REv. 3, 4-6, 34-40 (1979).
Another 76 cases involved questions of federalism and separation of powers. Only a minor-
ity of the decisions actually interpreted provisions of the Constitution, but in most of the
other cases the constitutional underpinnings were quite close to the surface. See Table IV;
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in that direction would entail grave consequences both for the way in
which the Court goes about its work and for the way in which that
work is perceived by the citizenry.
Internally, the Court would lose an important source of self disci-
pline. When the Justices consider a constitutional issue, they are
guided only by the broad, even cryptic, language of the constitutional
text and by the Court's own precedents. Much the same can be said of
decisions interpreting statutes like the Sherman Act, the National La-
bor Relations Act, and, to a lesser degree, the 1871 Civil Rights Act. In
contrast, when the Court decides cases under statutes like the Clean Air
Act, the Truth in Lending Act, or the Internal Revenue Code, it must
work within the confines of detailed and specific statutory language,
and often other legislative materials as well. 216 These cases serve two
important functions within the Court. They assure the continued in-
volvement of the Justices in the traditions of the lawyer's craft; and
they remind the members of the Court that the Constitution is not the
only source of values, and that the decisions of the representative
branches of government are entitled to respect.21 7
see also Hellman, supra note 59, at 583-98. In addition, there were about 20 cases which
primarily involved issues of general federal law or the jurisdiction and procedure of federal
courts, but which had constitutional ramifications of one sort or another-usually secondary
or undecided questions of constitutional interpretation. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1744-
45. This leaves only about 150 cases in which the issues presented to the Court were totally
lacking in constitutional overtones.
In one sense, of course, virtually all questions of federal law have constitutional radia-
tions, since every definition of a federal right will tend to expand or contract the potential
coverage of state law. See, e.g., McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 675 (1982) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (in defining scope of federal criminal statute, the "Court has allowed the [fed-
eral] prosecutor to encroach into an area of state responsibility. . ."); cf. United Ass'n of
Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. v. Local 334,452 U.S. 615,
639 n.13 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting): "This case is important not because of its un-
remarkable holding that a union constitution is a contract but because the case is a striking
example of the easy way in which this Court enlarges the power of the Federal Government
.. . at the expense of the States." However, in relation to the argument developed in the
text, it is relevant to distinguish between issues that directly implicate claims or defenses
grounded on the Constitution and those in which the constitutional implications lie far be-
low the surface.
216. It is true that statutory interpretation can provide the occasion for judicial activism,
but the effect is to put the Court in an even worse position from the standpoint of public
acceptance of its decisions. See Barnett, The Supreme Court of Caifornia, 1981-82, Fore-
word: The Emerging Court, 71 CALIF. L. Rv. 1134, 1189-91 (1983). In any event, critics of
"activism" by the United States Supreme Court have focused almost exclusively on the
Court's constitutional rulings; unlike the critics of the California Supreme Court, they gener-
ally have not accused the Justices of distorting statutory law in order to promote their own
ideas of public policy.
217. See Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787, 790 (1974); 2 Hruska Commis-
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Some people think that the Court has been rather "activist" over
the last two or three decades. Perhaps it has. But it has at least had the
anchor to conventional adjudication that comes from having to con-
sider, in each argument session, a few cases of a more obviously and
traditionally "legal" nature. That anchor would be gone if all or most
of the routine statutory cases were routed to an auxiliary tribunal.
Routine statutory issues may also play an important role in pre-
serving collegiality within the Court. Voting blocs that persist across a
wide range of constitutional issues often tend to break up when less
earth-shaking questions of statutory interpretation are presented.2" 8
The existence of cases in which the Court finds itself unified--or di-
vided along unexpected lines-serves to moderate the tensions that are
likely to build up in cases involving the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the division of powers between state and federal gov-
ernments.219 Conversely, the loss of routine statutory issues might well
serve to intensify and make more bitter the divisions that do exist
among the Justices.22
Everyone who has served as a member of a small group knows the
importance of having some matters on which all members can agree
and work together. For the Supreme Court, these are the same techni-
cal, relatively uncontroversial issues that under the proposed legislation
would be the prime candidates for referral to the new court. Thus, in
all likelihood, the Court would end up hearing only the most difficult
and divisive cases. Not only would this make the Justices' job more
difficult; it would probably lead to an even greater proliferation of sep-
arate opinions.
For the Court to cut itself off from narrow statutory questions
would pose even greater dangers for the way in which the Court's work
is perceived by legislators and the general public. In a democratic soci-
sion Hearings, supra note 133, at 732-33 (statement of Dean Sandalow); id at 1238-39 (re-
marks of Judge (then Dean) Pollak).
218. For example, in the 1981 Term, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan invaria-
bly took opposing positions when the Court divided 5-4 on civil rights issues, but they found
themselves on the same side in two cases where matters of general federal law were resolved
by 5-4 votes. See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982); United Steelworkers v.
Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
219. In the 1981 Term, the Court was unanimous in only 25% of the civil rights cases
decided on the merits, but in the general federal law segment of the docket the figure was
40%.
220. I am indebted to Professor David L. Shapiro for bringing this point to my attention.
See also Bender, Book Review, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 716, 725-26 (1980).
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ety, the legitimacy of judicial review depends in no small part on a
shared recognition that the Court nullifies decisions by the representa-
tive branches of government not because it is empowered to second-
guess the wisdom or appropriateness of majoritarian determinations,
not because it is a "superlegislature," but only, in Justice Harlan's
words, "because [it is] a court of law. . . charged with the responsibil-
ity of adjudicating cases or controversies according to the law of the
land and because the law applidable to any such dispute necessarily
includes the Federal Constitution."22 The more the Court devotes it-
self to constitutional adjudication, and the less attention it gives to stat-
utory questions of a more conventionally "legal" kind, the easier it is to
lose sight of the underpinnings of the Court's role, and the more diffi-
cult it will be to defend the Court's intervention.
That intervention is difficult to defend under the best of circum-
stances. Many of the Court's rulings are extremely unpopular. And
constitutional decisionmaking necessarily involves a large element of
policy choice on matters not addressed by the text or contemplated by
the Framers. Thus it is all the more important that the public be re-
minded at frequent intervals that the Court does, after all, decide ques-
tions of law.
It is true that a conscientious Supreme Court could minimize these
dangers by keeping thirty to forty relatively routine statutory cases for
itself each Term. Yet the more the Court attempts to retain a represen-
tative sample of statutory issues, the greater the danger that the two
courts will develop parallel lines of authority that are arguably applica-
ble to the same cases. Here again, categorical reference would reduce,
though perhaps not entirely eliminate, the problem. 22
C. Some Empirical Evidence
Inevitably, debate over the desirability of creating an auxiliary
court involves a large degree of speculation. We must first make pre-
dictions about how the Supreme Court would manage its docket if it
had the option of referring cases to the new tribunal, and then, on the
basis of those predictions, gauge the probable effects on the Court and
on uniformity in the law. The latter inquiry must be almost entirely
hypothetical, but as to the former there is one bit of evidence that may
provide some clues.
221. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
222. See supra text following note 188.
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By examining the Court's published order lists, we can identify
those cases that, under the present system, came within one vote of the
four required for plenary review. The inference can be drawn-though
it is far from compeling22 --that these are the cases that would have
been adjudicated at the national level if the Intercircuit Tribunal had
been in existence. That is, if the total national decisional capacity had
been enlarged through the availability of the reference option, these are
the cases that would most likely have received either four votes for re-
view by the Supreme Court or five votes for reference to the new
tribunal.
Study of the order lists in the four Terms 1977 through 1980
reveals that there were 119 cases in which three Justices voted to grant
certiorari or note probable jurisdiction but could not persuade a fourth
Justice to join them; thus, under the Rule of Four, review was de-
nied.2 24 The overwhelming majority were civil rights cases,2 2 5 and the
largest portion of those involved issues of criminal law and proce-
dure.2 2 6 Only twenty-seven cases in all four Terms dealt with questions
of federalism, general federal law, or jurisdiction and procedure
outside the context of civil rights.
These findings lend at least some support to the views expressed in
the preceding pages. They confirm the Justices' strong, indeed overrid-
ing, interest in constitutional issues. We already know that the Court
cannot expand the number of cases that receive plenary considera-
tion,227 and that some statutory cases reach the plenary docket only
223. See infra text following note 230.
224. This figure excludes cases in which Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall would
have reversed obscenity convictions, along with a few cases in which the dissenting Justices
would have vacated the judgment below for reconsideration in light of an intervening
Supreme Court decision or other development.
Of the 119 cases, 28 came before the Court on appeal; thus the dissents might well have
rested on an unwillingness to affirm a ruling of dubious correctness, rather than a belief that
the cases warranted consideration by the Supreme Court. This interpretation is supported
by the fact that in 15 of the appeal cases, one of the three votes for plenary consideration
came from Justice Stevens, who takes a very narrow view of the Court's certiorari function
and never notes his dissent from the denial of discretionary review. See Watt v. Alaska, 451
U.S. 259, 273-76 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940,
942 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
225. For a description of the classification scheme used here, see Hellman, supra note 2,
at 1739-43 (civil rights), 1760-65 (federalism), 1774-75 (general federal law), and 1785 (juris-
diction and procedure).
226. In two-thirds of the cases in which the lower court had rejected a civil rights claim,
Justices Brennan and Marshall provided two of the three votes for review. In two-thirds of
the cases upholding the claim, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist were among the
three dissenters.
227. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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because the Court feels obliged to resolve an intercircuit conflict.22
Putting these facts together, it is quite plausible to suppose that if the
reference option had been available, at least some of the three-vote
constitutional cases would have received the fourth vote necessary for
consideration within the Court, while an equal number of statutory
cases would have been routed to the Intercircuit Tribunal.229 The effect
would have been to bring the Court one step closer to having a purely
constitutional docket, without necessarily increasing the number of na-
tionally binding precedents on statutory issues, where the need for ad-
ditional guidance exists if it exists anywhere.23
Admittedly, these data are far from definitive. For one thing,
there may well be cases in which three Justices voted to grant plenary
review, but one or more of them chose not to make their position pub-
lic. More important, the availability of the reference option would it-
self change the Justices' voting behavior in ways we cannot fully
anticipate. Nevertheless, at the present time we have no better evi-
dence as to what would happen if the national decisional capacity were
to be expanded in the manner proposed by the pending legislation.
And that evidence is not reassuring.
Nor is reassurance provided by anything the Justices have said.
On the contrary, statements by one member of the Court tend to con-
firm the hypothesis advanced here. In his speech to the American Bar
Association, Chief Justice Burger predicted that "if there is not prompt
action to give relief [to the Supreme Court], there will be a large in-
crease in summary dispositions, particularly in .. .criminal cases
when the lower courts have either misread or ignored our controlling
holdings."23' Presumably the Court would not allow these judgments
to stand if the new tribunal were created; instead, it would give them
plenary consideration. And if the pattern of recent years were to con-
228. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
229. This hypothesis is further supported by examination of the changes in the composi-
tion of the plenary docket in the early 1970's. Starting in the 1971 Term, the Court substan-
tially increased the number of cases receiving plenary consideration. The data indicate that
this came about because the Justices were unwilling to cut back on their activity in the area
of civil rights, but recognized the need for a larger number of authoritative precedents in
other areas of federal law. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1789-93. It is plausible to suppose
that if another tribunal had been available to resolve confficts on nonconstitutional issues,
the Court would have made use of the reference option to maintain its high level of activity
in the area of civil rights without having to expand the total number of cases receiving
plenary consideration.
230. See Hellman, supra note 2, at 1775-76.
231. Burger, supra note 6, at 445.
tinue, these would be largely cases in which the lower court had ac-
cepted the defendant's constitutional claim.
232
It would be wrong to read too much into the Chief Justice's com-
ments, but they do suggest a line of inquiry that Congress ought to
pursue. There would be no point in creating the Intercircuit Tribu-
nal--or any auxiliary court-unless the members of the Supreme Court
were in substantial agreement both on the need for the new structure
and on the use to which it would be put. Thus, at some point in the
national debate, the Justices will have to speak out. Would it not be
desirable to ask them to tell us quite specifically how they would use
the reference option-perhaps even to identify the cases that would be
sent to the new court?
There would be no need for the Justices to submit agreed-on case
lists to Congress. Rather, they could provide the information in a series
of individual or joint opinions dissenting from--or concurring in-the
denial of plenary review. Opinions and notations of this kind are al-
ready part of the Court's regular practice; the added burden of specify-
ing the cases that particular Justices would send to the new court would
be minimal.233 And only on the basis of such a record can Congress
and the public make informed judgments about how the reference op-
tion would work and what its consequences would be.234
232. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Podgurski, 459 U.S. 1222 (1983) (Burger, C.L, dissenting
from denial of certiorari): "In my view, only the finite limitations of the Court's time pre-
clude our granting review of this case. I would grant certiorari and summarily reverse the
judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts [upholding the defendant's
Fourth Amendment claim]." See also Florida v. Meyers, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855-56 & n.3
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing cases); Stevens, Judicial Restraint, supra note 16, at
179-80.
233. Justice Stevens-who opposes the Intercircuit Tribunal proposal-has taken the
first steps in this direction. See supra note 209. At this writing, none of the Justices who
support the legislation have identified particular cases that would be appropriate for referral.
234. The need for this information is underscored by consideration of the differing views
expressed by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Both have endorsed the idea of an
intercircuit tribunal, and both envision sending 35 to 50 cases a year to the new court. How-
ever, the Chief Justice would use the reference option to reduce the Supreme Court's own
docket to about 100 cases a year, while Justice Rehnquist would retain the present level of
150. Compare Burger, supra note 6, at 447, with Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 6. Since a
plenary docket of 100 cases would be just about filled by the civil rights and federalism
caseloads of recent years, the Chief Justice's approach would almost certainly bring about
the results hypothesized in the text: a Supreme Court devoted almost entirely to constitu-
tional litigation, and little if any increase in the number of nationally binding decisions on
statutory issues. Justice Rehnquist's approach might or might not have those consequences;
that would depend on how many constitutional cases were heard by the Supreme Court in
the place of statutory cases sent to the new tribunal. What the full Court would do, we do
not know. But of the 55 cases in which Justice Relnquist dissented from the denial of
plenary review in the 1977-1980 Terms, 41 involved constitutional issues.
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V. Designing a Structure
Further research may show that there are indeed more cases de-
serving resolution at the national level than one Supreme Court can
comfortably handle. The task then will be to design a structure that
will enlarge the national decisional capacity without compromising the
values that have given the federal judicial system the stature it enjoys
today.
I have already argued that a rotating panel system is unlikely to
foster uniformity and certainty in the law.235 Assuming that this defect
can be cured by having a smaller court that would always sit en banc,
two other questions must be addressed. First, how should the judges of
the new court be selected? Second, should the tribunal be established
on a temporary or on a permanent basis?
A. Selection of the Judges
Under the Senate bill as originally introduced, the members of the
Intercircuit Tribunal would be designated by the circuit councils of the
various circuits.236 There are several difficulties with this approach. To
begin with, it is anomalous at best to decentralize the process of select-
ing judges for a national court. The incongruity is particularly striking
in view of the 1980 legislation that gave the circuits wide leeway to
decide how many judges would serve on the councils and how they
would be chosen.237
More than a lack of symmetry is at stake. Ordinarily, when new
judges are selected for a court, the appointing authority considers,
among other factors, the composition of the court apart from the posi-
tions to be filled. That kind of coordination would be impossible if the
members of the Tribunal were chosen in separate proceedings in the
various circuits. 238 Indeed, there is surely some irony in creating a
court to promote uniformity, but having the judges selected by thirteen
235. See supra text accompanying notes 180-82.
236. S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 602(a) (1983), 129 CONG. REC. S1955 (daily ed. Mar.
1, 1983). This feature was also found in the initial version of the House bill. H.R. 1970, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
237. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035, 2035 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1982)).
238. For example, as Professor A. Leo Levin pointed out in his statement to a Senate
subcommittee, it would probably be a good idea to have some senior judges on the new
court, but it would not be desirable if all of the members of the court had senior status.
Under the system contemplated by S. 645 as originally introduced, it would be impossible to
assure an appropriate balance.
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separate groups of individuals, each employing its own standards and
procedures.
Vesting the appointment power in the circuit councils also runs a
substantial risk of fostering dissension and politicization among the
judges. To avoid those consequences, many if not all of the circuits are
likely to adopt some sort of lottery system for choosing the members of
the new tribunal. In this they would be following the procedure used
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to select its "limited en banc"
panels.239 But whatever the merits of that system for declaring the law
of the circuit,2' it would introduce a jarring element of arbitrariness,
both in appearance and in reality, if a group of judges selected at ran-
dom were to be given the power to establish the law of the nation.
For all of these reasons, it would be unwise to have the members
of the auxiliary court chosen within the various circuits. How, then,
might they be selected? Some proposals have vested the appointment
power in the Supreme Court as a whole,241 others, in the Chief Justice
alone.242 However, neither system is desirable. The former would not
only add to the burdens of the Justices; it would also provide a fertile
ground for tension and dissension within the Supreme Court. The lat-
ter would give far too much power to one individual. It is one thing to
authorize the Chief Justice to designate judges for specialized tribunals
such as the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals or the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.243 It is quite another to allow him to
select the individuals who will establish nationally binding precedents
on a wide variety of recurring issues, subject only to occasional review
by the Supreme Court.
Indeed, a more fundamental principle is at stake here. Recent
events have reminded us of the inherent tension between majoritarian
power and an independent judiciary.2" To allow judges-any
239. 9TH CIR. R. 25.
240. See HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 61, 67 F.RD. at 269; NLRB v.
Say-On Drugs, Inc., 716 F.2d 574, 575 (9th Cir. 1983) (Chambers, J., dissenting from en
banc order).
241. This is the procedure contemplated by the revised Senate bill reported out by the
subcommittee on June 29, 1983, and by the amended House bill reported out by the subcom-
mittee on September 13, 1984.
242. See, e.g., H.R. 4762, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); see 127 CONG. REc. H7497 (daily
ed. Oct. 20, 1981) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier).
243. But see Morrison & Stenhouse, The Chief Justice of the United States: More Than
Just the Highest Ranking Judge, I CONST. COMMENTARY 57, 67-68 (1984) (questioning wis-
dom of this delegation of power).
244. Cf. 130 CONG. REc. S2901 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Helms after
defeat of constitutional amendment permitting prayer in schools) ("iT]here is more than one
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judges-to select the members of an important court would upset the
delicate balance that has been worked out over the years. By elimina-
ting the role of the Senate and the President at the appointment stage,
such an arrangement would severely weaken the majoritarian check
that makes it possible for a democratic society to accept the exercise of
vast lawmaking powers by judges who, once appointed, are not respon-
sive to the political process.
It is no answer to say that because the new court would be dealing
only with statutory issues, Congress could always overrule its decisions.
Even if the court has misinterpreted the legislative will, forces such as
inertia, deadlock, or the pressure of other business will often make it
impossible to amend a statute. 24 5 Nor is it adequate that the members
of the panel, as circuit judges, will have previously been nominated and
confirmed through the Article III process. Appointments to the circuit
bench generally are treated as regional appointments; 246 sometimes
they are the prerogative of a single Senator. 47 While the quality of the
judges has been very high, the candidates simply do not receive the
kind of national scrutiny that could be anticipated for appointments to
what would be, in effect, an auxiliary Supreme Court. 48
It follows that the new tribunal should be constituted in the same
way as all existing general-function federal courts: its judges should be
appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. That, in-
deed, was the recommendation of the Hruska Commission, which
reached its conclusion after carefully weighing the alternatives.249 As
already noted, however, the bills now under consideration take a differ-
ent approach: the new court would be composed of sitting circuit
judges designated to serve for limited periods of time.
Proponents of this system place great emphasis on how little it
way for Congress to provide a check on arrogant Supreme Court Justices who routinely
distort the Constitution to suit their own notions of public policy.").
245. See Hellman, The Supreme Court and Statutory Law: The Plenary Docket in the
1970's, 40 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 38 (1978).
246. See Fowler, 4 Comparison of Initial Recommendation Procedures: Judicial Selection
Under Reagan and Carter, I YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 299, 322-23 (1983).
247. Id at 320-25 (although Senators play a smaller role in the selection of circuit judges
than in the appointment of district judges, their influence is often substantial and sometimes
decisive). See also Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection: Will They Affect the Senate's
Role? (Part II), 64 JUDICATURE 114, 131 (1980).
248. No one would suggest that a district judge could be elevated to the circuit bench
without presidential appointment and confirmation by the Senate simply because he is al-
ready an Article III judge. The position of judge on a court that has the power to establish
nationally binding precedents is as different from that of circuit judge as the position of
circuit judge is different from that of district judge.
249. HRUSKA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 30-31, 67 F.R.D. at 237-38.
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would cost.2 5 ° And at a time when both political parties are struggling
to reduce government spending, there is an obvious attraction in the
prospect of increasing the national decisional capacity without creating
any new judgeships. However, in the context of a federal budget that
now exceeds $800 billion, the amount of money that would be required
for an auxiliary court barely rises above the level of the trivial. In fiscal
1983 the budget for the Supreme Court came to about $15 million-
less than was authorized for the maintenance, care, and operation of
the House office buildings.25' If disuniformity is truly rampant in fed-
eral law, interfering on a large scale with the efficient planning of trans-
actions and the speedy resolution of disputes, the cost of a new national
court, smaller and less prestigious than the Supreme Court, would be a
small price to pay to set things right.
In any event, it would be shortsighted to consider only fiscal costs.
Just recently, Congress enacted legislation creating twenty-four new
judgeships in the courts of appeals to meet the demands imposed by
current caseloads.252 Those caseloads are not likely to diminish in the
years to come. Obviously, judges who are deciding cases at the na-
tional level can handle correspondingly fewer cases in their own cir-
cuits. 253 Something would have to give: either circuit backlogs would
grow, or decisional processes would be further truncated. 4 Whatever
the outcome, the system and its users would incur costs, albeit not ones
that would be reflected in the federal budget.
The preference for the designation approach may also rest on the
feeling that it would be politically unacceptable to give a single Presi-
dent the opportunity to appoint the entire initial membership of the
new court. However, as long as at least one House is controlled by a
party other than the President's, it should be possible, at the time of
establishing the court, to reach an informal understanding that would
require diversity and bipartisanship in the first group of appointments.
250. See, e.g., 129 CONG. REc. S1948 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1983) (remarks of Sen. Dole); id
HI 192 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1983) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); 1982 National Court Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 7 (remarks of Professor Meador); Heflin, supra note 14, at 12.
251. Compare BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 1983, H.R. Doc. No.
98-138, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-15 (1984) ($14,675,000 authorized for Supreme Court), with
id at 8-10 ($20,842,000 authorized for House office buildings).
252. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333, 346 (1984).
253. In fact, because the cases routed to the Intercircuit Tribunal would be, by definition,
cases of unusual difficulty, it is possible that each one would consume as much time as
several ordinary circuit cases.
254. See Hellman, supra note 33, at 939-40, 989-93.
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Last-and emphatically least-the designation approach may be
seen as a way of mollifying the feelings of circuit judges who would
otherwise perceive the new tribunal as eroding the prestige of their own
courts.255 But if the new court is created on the basis of convincing
evidence that the present system is not working, it is unlikely that cir-
cuit judges would feel more than a twinge of regret at the passing of the
old order. In any event, if the lack of national appellate capacity has
reached the point of desperation, the judges' sensitivities surely should
not be allowed to stand in the way of necessary reform.
B. A "Temporary" or a "Permanent" Tribunal?
The pending legislation differs from the Hruska Commission's
proposal in a second important respect: it would create only a "tempo-
rary" tribunal that would automatically go out of existence if Congress
did not reauthorize it. The concerns underlying this approach are cer-
tainly understandable. The proponents seek to mute the instinctive op-
position of the bar and the judiciary to the creation of additional
structures within the judicial system. And what could be more reassur-
ing than to provide that unless the new court has proved its worth, it
will simply disappear into oblivion? But notwithstanding its surface
appeal, I think that a "sunset" provision would be unwise.
To begin with, it is important to remember that Congress can abol-
ish even a "permanent" court. That is precisely what happened with
the Commerce Court: three years after it was created, Congress put an
end to its existence, and thereafter the judges continued to serve on
other Article III courts.
256
Of course, it must be conceded that the new court is much less
likely to suffer this fate if abolition rather than reauthorization requires
affirmative action by Congress. And in any event, proponents of the
sunset provision will ask, what's wrong with an experiment? What
harm can there be in giving the new court a trial run so that advocates
and doubters alike can see how it will actually work?
I see three major drawbacks to the "experimentar' approach.
First, in the words of the Hruska Commission, a new court "would be
significantly handicapped. . . if its decisions lacked the authority and
credibility of an independent tribunal, the position of which was se-
255. See, e.g., 1976 National Court Hearings, supra note 200, at 245 (statement of Judge
Friendly); id at 183 (statement of Judge Coffin).
256. See F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 172-73
(1928).
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cured by a permanent charter. 25 7 Why so? The court would be exer-
cising the power of review over judges who previously had to answer
only to the United States Supreme Court. To make matters worse,
under a system of reference jurisdiction the panel would be in the
anomalous situation of not being able to enforce its precedents without
the intervention of another tribunal. If by law the new court were
scheduled to go out of existence on a specified day a few years in the
future, the authority of its decisions would be rendered even more pre-
carious. In contrast, if the new court were designed to be permanent
(though always subject to the will of Congress), both judges and law-
yers would have a much stronger motivation to treat it as a fait accom-
pli and respect its judgments.
Second, a sunset provision would make the new court much more
vulnerable to the combined effect of various human weaknesses. Mak-
ing the tribunal only "temporary" reduces the incentive for its creators
to build a solid record showing that the present system is inadequate.
The weaker the evidence of need, the more likely it is that lower-court
judges will resent the new court as an unjustifiable addition to the hier-
archy that reduces the authority of their own decisions. And the more
widespread that perception, the greater the difficulty the tribunal will
have in securing understanding and absorption of its precedents.
Finally, notwithstanding what I have just said, "temporary" struc-
tures have a way of becoming permanent. 58 That fate is particularly
likely to befall the proposed new court because it will be impossible to
know after five or even seven years whether it is achieving its purpose
of reducing something as intangible as disuniformity in the law. Thus,
unless the tribunal proves to be an utter disaster, Congress is likely to
extend its life. And given the pressure of other business, there will be
neither time nor inclination to rethink any of the particulars. As a re-
sult, it will be difficult if not impossible to eliminate the design flaws
that are inevitable when the legislature creates what it envisages as only
a temporary structure.
257. HRUSKA CoMMIssIoN REPORT, mu/pra note 2, at 31, 67 F.R.D. at 238.
258. For example, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) was created in
1971 to adjudicate cases arising under the Nixon administration's wage-price control pro-
gram. Today, more than a decade after the last of the controls were removed, TECA contin-
ues to function. Its current docket consists of overcharge cases growing out of the
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973-another statute imposing price controls that
are no longer in effect. See Hershey, fhere 'Temporary'Has Lasted 13 Years, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 5, 1984, at BiO, col 4 ("TECA... has become something of a monument to the
truism that the only thing in Washington more permanent than a temporary tax is a tempo-
rary bureaucracy.").
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Already we have evidence of this carelessness. The Senate bill has
now gone through a markup session, and has been favorably reported
by a subcommittee, without anyone's having cleaned up some loose
language that can only cause confusion and uncertainty. For example,
the bill provides that "[u]nless modified or overruled by the Supreme
Court, decisions of the Intercircuit Tribunal. . .shall be binding on all
courts of the United States ... ."9 The Tribunal itself would be a
"court of the United States." Thus, read literally, this language says
that the Tribunal could not overrule its own decisions. Is that what the
drafters want?
Perhaps it is. After all, the Tribunal would function as an auxil-
iary to the Supreme Court, and one can argue that only the latter
should be able to overrule or modify its decisions. The argument
would have special force in cases where the Supreme Court had denied
certiorari to a Tribunal ruling. Yet it would be anomalous at the
least-and perhaps contrary to separation of powers principles-for the
legislature to prohibit a court from overruling its own precedents.
260
I do not know how this question ought to be resolved. I do know
that it requires careful consideration and should not be settled by inad-
vertence. Nor should Congress leave up in the air such matters as the
number of votes required before the Supreme Court could refer a
case261 or the relationship between the reference option and the obliga-
259. S. 645, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 604(b)(1), 129 CONG. REC. S1947, S1956 (daily ed.
Mar. 1, 1983). The quoted language remained unchanged in the version reported out by the
subcommittee.
260. Candor requires me to acknowledge that the language quoted from S. 645 was
modeled upon the parallel provision in S. 3423, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a) (1976)-a provi-
sion that I helped to draft. In hearings on the 1976 legislation, Judge (then Dean) Louis H.
Pollak raised questions about possible unintended effects of the language (although he did
not suggest that the apparent prohibition on overruling by the new court might have been
deliberate). 1976 National Court Hearings, supra note 200, at 114 (remarks of Judge Pollak).
261. In contrast to the Senate bill, H.R. 1970 does not address the question of how many
votes would be required to refer a case to the Intercircuit Tribunal. Since courts ordinarily
act through majority vote, I assume that the intention is that five votes would be required.
There is thus a tension between the proposed § 1259(a) and the Rule of Four, under which a
case will be heard by the Supreme Court if four Justices so wish. One approach would be to
make clear in the legislative history that the Rule of Four would continue to operate. A
preferable solution, however, might be to require six votes for reference to the new court.
Congressman Kastenmeier invited the Justices to give their views on this matter, see
Letter from Rep. Kastenmeier to Chief Justice Burger (Aug. 4, 1983) (to be printed as part of
the hearing record on H.R. 1970), but only Justice Rehnquist did so. He expressed the hope
that the law, if enacted, "would leave it to our Court to decide the number of Justices re-
quired in order to refer a case .. to the intercircuit tribunal." Rehnquist Letter, supra note
10, at 3.
tory jurisdiction.262 But as long as only a temporary tribunal is con-
templated, it is understandable that little attention would be paid to
details of this kind.
Thus, if Congress is convinced that the Supreme Court cannot
provide all of the nationally binding precedents that the legal system
needs, it should establish a seven-judge court without a termination
date.2 63  The legislation could provide for a study commission that
would come into existence six years after the new court begins opera-
tions, and that would be required, three years later, to make recom-
mendations to Congress and the President on whether the court should
be continued. If the evidence shows that the court is not needed or is
working badly, Congress could abolish it and designate the judges to sit
on the circuit and district courts.
Finally, if political realities compel the inclusion of a sunset provi-
sion, the new court should be given an initial lifespan of ten years
rather than five. Without at least that much time, evaluation would be
little more than guesswork. Of greater importance, the limited lifespan
need not and should not preclude Congress from providing for ap-
pointment of the judges by the President with the consent of the Senate.
262. Both the House and Senate bills state that when the Supreme Court refers a case
"which is subject to review by appeal," the Court shalldirect the Tribunal to "decide" the
case. Suppose the Tribunal finds that the case is moot or that other problems ofjusticiability
are present. May the Tribunal dismiss the appeal or vacate the judgment of the lower court
without deciding the merits of the case? Arguably the language of proposed § 1259 would
not permit such a disposition.
The simple solution is to eliminate any provision for referring appeal cases to the new
court. If Congress enacts pending legislation to eliminate the obligatory jurisdiction-as it
should--the only remaining cases still "subject to review by appeal" will be the few from
three-judge courts that involve reapportionment, the Voting Rights Act, and a few other
narrowly applicable civil rights statutes. There is no reason why the Supreme Court should
ever want to refer such cases to the Intercircuit Tribunal or any auxiliary court. It is thus
quite sufficient to limit the reference jurisdiction to certiorari cases.
Another puzzling aspect of the legislation is the provision in proposed § 1259(a) that the
Supreme Court could refer a case to the new court after deny/ng certiorari. Ordinarily, when
the Court denies certiorari, it can take further action on the case only by vacating the order
of denial. See, e.g, Simmons v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 103 S. Ct. 3079, 3080 (1983) (vacating
order denying certiorari, granting certiorari, and remanding case for further consideration in
light of intervening Supreme Court decision). Nor is it clear what purpose is served by
authorizing the Court to refer cases that are "pending." To give the Court the opportunity
to refer cases at any stage after the filing of the certiorari petition, all that is necessary is that
the Court be empowered to refer cases after the writ has been granted. If the Court -has
previously granted certiorari, it would enter a new order of referral; if the case is still await-
ing initial action, the Court would grant and refer simultaneously.
263. Seven is preferable to nine because it distinguishes the new tribunal from the
Supreme Court, and because a smaller number of judges can work together more easily.
Certainly no showing has been made that the volume of work destined for the court would
require more than seven full-time judges.
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If, after ten years, the court is not reestablished, the judges will be able
to provide useful service elsewhere in the federal judicial system.
Conclusion
Arguments that the Supreme Court is overworked, or that it can-
not resolve all of the issues that deserve resolution at the national level,
comport easily with our intuitions. We are a litigious nation of
235,000,000 people,2" and in an era when the scope and complexity of
federal law have expanded far beyond what was contemplated by the
Framers, it almost strains credulity to suggest that one Court of nine
Justices does not need help in performing the functions assigned to it in
our system of government.
Yet all would agree that changes in the structure of the federal
judicial system should not be based on intuitions, but on convincing
evidence that existing arrangements are not working. Legislation to
eliminate the remaining vestiges of the Supreme Court's obligatory ju-
risdiction meets that test, and should be enacted without further de-
lay.265 The same cannot be said of proposals to create an auxiliary
tribunal to assist the Court in deciding cases. There is simply not
enough evidence that the Supreme Court's limited capacity for authori-
tative decisionmaking has significantly frustrated society's need for uni-
formity and predictability in the law. Moreover, too little attention has
been paid to the possible adverse consequences of creating a new court.
The want of evidence is no less tolerable if the new court is estab-
lished with a "sunset" provision. Indeed, the saddest aspect of the cur-
rent drive for a "temporary" tribunal is that the experimental label can
all too easily become a substitute for careful analysis of the need for the
new court and the structure that would best satisfy it. And if that anal-
ysis is not undertaken before the tribunal is first created, it is unlikely
ever to be attempted at a time when it can make a difference. More-
over, the shaky empirical foundation would itself increase the difficulty
the new court will have in maintaining the authority of its precedents.
Nor should it be forgotten that the subjects of the proposed "ex-
periment" would not be mice or monkeys, but the judges of the United
States, the lawyers who rely on their decisions, and the millions of indi-
264. But see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Alegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (suggesting that perceptions of excessive litigiousness may be
exaggerated).
265. See supra note 83; Supreme Court Jurisdiction Hearings, supra note 26, at 29-34
(statement of Prof. Helman).
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viduals who must conduct their affairs in accordance with the dictates
of federal law. Surely none of these groups should be put at risk with-
out substantial evidence that the present system is failing us and cannot
be repaired through less drastic measures.
In the end, judgments about the need for an Intercircuit Tribunal
or something similar to it may depend as much on one's perception of
how legal rules operate as on the results of empirical studies. Thus, if it
were shown that actual intercircuit conflicts were going unresolved on a
large scale, the case for structural reform would be quite strong; but
even then there would still be room for "arguments about how essential
it is. . .that. . . particular question[s] be taken up and authoritatively
settled at the highest judicial level. ' 26 6 And the more meager the num-
bers, or the larger the proportion that are no more than "sideswipes,"
the easier it will be to maintain that inaction by the Supreme Court
pales into insignificance in the light of other sources of uncertainty in
the law.
Nevertheless, it is a necessary first step to find out what the
Supreme Court is not doing and how its limited capacity for decision-
making actually affects people's ability to plan and litigate efficiently.
To forego this inquiry is to run the risk of pursuing mischievous "solu-
tions" to problems that exist only in the mind of the beholder.
266. 1976 National Court Hearings, supra note 200, at 190-91 (statement of Prof.
Rosenberg).
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Appendix
The Supreme Court and the
National Law: A First View of
the Plenary Docket in the
1980's*
By ARTHUR D. HELLMAN**
In a recently published article, I examined in detail the selection of
cases for the Supreme Court's plenary docket in the last three Terms of
the 1970's.1 While it was possible to take some account of develop-
ments in the 1980 and 1981 Terms, any study of this kind will inevita-
bly fall short of being fully current, and this one was no exception. It
has therefore occurred to me that it might be useful to make available
at this time my preliminary figures on the composition of the plenary
docket in the 1980 through 1982 Terms.
The desirability of doing so is by no means clear. For one thing,
the figures are indeed preliminary, subject to revision in the light of
further analysis or subsequent developments that put decisions into a
different perspective. More important, raw case totals can at best tell
only part of the story. To mention one particularly troublesome omis-
sion, secondary holdings and alternative characterizations disappear
entirely from the picture.
There are two reasons why I have opted for publication in spite of
these limitations. First, the data need not be considered in isolation;
the earlier article can provide context, definitions, and other aids to
interpretation. 2 Second, as far as I have been able to determine, this
* © Copyright 1984, Arthur D. Hellman.
** Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. B.A. 1963, Harvard University; LL.B.
1966, Yale University.
1. Hellman, The Supreme Court, the National Law, and the Selection of Casesfor the
Plenary Docket, 44 U. PiTT. L. REV. 521 (1983).
2. That article, in turn, draws upon the background and modes of analysis set forth in
Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925." The Plenary
Docket in the 1970", 91 HARV. L. REv. 1709 (1978); Hellman, The Supreme Court and Civil
Rights: The Plenary Docket in the 1970", 58 OR. L. REv. 3 (1979); and Hellman, The
Supreme Court and Statutory Law: The Plenary Docket in the 1970", 40 U. PiTT. L. Rav. 1
(1978).
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information is not available anywhere else in readily usable form.'
The data are presented in six tables on the pages that follow.4 For
convenience, the figures for the four three-Term periods from 1968
through 1979 have been repeated, along with the figures for the indi-
vidual Terms 1977 through 1979.'
3. The tables published each November by the Harvard Law Review are so detailed as
to make it very difficult to monitor changes over the years. See, e.g., The Supreme Court,
1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. Rav. 62, 309-11 (1982).
4. The corresponding tables in Hellman, supra note 1, are Tables I, X, III, XIII, XIV,
and XV. See id at 528, 579, 534, 586-87, 600-01, & 628. Table II differs from its predecessor
(Table X) in one respect: it gives separate figures for decisions on freedom of speech.
5. Figures for the individual Terms from 1959 through 1976 can be found in the arti-
cles cited supra note 2.
For a brief discussion of significant changes in the content of the plenary docket in the
1980's, see Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court, 60 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. (forthcom-
ing 1985).
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